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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines some of the factors which have
made the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee an outlier in terms of
congressional oversight during the past decade. Interviews
with congressional staff and examination of hearing reports
focus on eight issues which reached the hearing stage during
the 101st Congress (1989-91). Five dependent variables were
reviewed:
origin of each investigation
Chairman Dingell's role
subcommittee member participation
partisanship and minority involvement
outcome of the investigation
The focus of the paper is the incongruence between
staff perceptions of the subcommittee and the picture which
emerges from an examination of available data. Staff
members describe a subcommittee which is nonpartisan in its
goals and tactics in which investigations are initiated by
staff members, conducted independently of member
involvement, and not intended to produce legislative change.
What emerges from an inspection of the data, however, is a
picture of a subcommittee which focuses on the interests of
its chairman, where active participation is strongest among
minority members, involves an appreciable degree of partisan
tension, and frequently results in the introduction of new
legislation.
The contrast between these conflicting images indicates
a serious methodological problem in relying primarily on
interviews with subcommittee staff members and examining
specific cases to generalize about the function of a
congressional unit.
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AGGRESSIVE OVERSIGHT:
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The conservative mood of the 1980s and the mounting
deficit accumulated during a decade of divided government
have been instrumental in elevating Congressional oversight
of the bureaucracy to a prime spot on some committee agen
das.

However, as a recent report of the National Academy of

Public Administration concluded, although oversight in
absolute terms appears to be on the rise, it tends to be
"narrowly focused, ad hoc and episodic...focusing on gaining
public attention and having little lasting effect."1

In

part, this situation is the result of a Democratic Congres
sional strategy utilizing the oversight mechanism to in
crease public awareness of and support for programs which it
perceived to be in jeopardy under a Republican administra
tion which had campaigned on a pledge to reduce the size of
government and cut domestic spending.
The key question, however, is not how much oversight

Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies: The Need
to Strike a Balance and Focus on Performance, report published
by the National Academy Panel on Congressional Oversight of
the National Academy of Public Administration, 1988 (Chair:
Richard Wegman), 44.
2

3

occurs, but whether congressional interest in executive
agencies translates into effective policy management.

A

heightened activity level among congressional oversight
committees may be meaningless if the primary purpose is to
increase public support for favored programs to avoid budget
cuts rather than to conscientiously examine compliance with
congressional intent.

Many of the criticisms of oversight

during the past fifteen years focus on this aspect or its
close relative, the "sweetheart alliances" of the iron
triangles assumed to exist between many committees and the
agencies and industries they oversee.
In his 1976 study of oversight,2 Morris Ogul lists
seven "opportunity factors" which provide a framework for
examining congressional attitudes toward aggressive manage
ment of the administrative bureaucracy: legal authority;
expansion of staff and budget resources; the jurisdiction of
the committee; committee structure and orientation of the
committee; the chairman's feelings about oversight or a
particular agency, program, or policy area; relations with
the executive branch; and finally, individual member priori
ties .
Ogul suggests that for these opportunity factors to
evolve into actual oversight activity, two additional con
version factors may be necessary: policy disagreement with
the president, and/or external events (a scandal, media

2Morris Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy. (Pitts
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 13-20.
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attention, or complaints by constituents or interest
groups),3 Further, If the leadership of the majority party
in Congress believes that it can cause sufficient embarrass
ment to a past or current president and reap significant
advantage for itself by calling attention to the performance
of agency heads, it may succumb to the "irresistible urge"
to tarnish the President's reputation.4
Throughout the 198 0s, the political climate certainly
favored ,an aggressive congressional posture'with regard to
oversight of the Republican administration.

The reforms of

the 1970s had clearly given the Congress unprecedented legal
authority under the Legislative Reorganization Act to in
crease oversight activities.

An expansion of the size and

technical expertise of committee staffs and budgets provided
resources which could be devoted to this activity.

A reduc

tion in funds available for new federal programs increased
the political incentives for committees and individual
congressmen to focus on maximizing the efficiency of exist
ing programs and, whenever possible, to attempt to embarrass
the administration.

Finally, there was sharp disagreement

with the President over proposed spending cuts in domestic
programs.
As could be expected during two decades of divided
government, members of Congress have expanded the amount of

3Ibid, 136.
4Seymour Scher, "Conditions for Legislative Control,"
Journal of Politics 25 (3) (August 1963), 541.

5

time and effort they have devoted to pursuing the elusive,
and often uncomfortable, task of scrutinizing the very
programs they fought to create.

In his study of oversight

activity over a twenty-five year period, Joel Aberbach
documented a 300% increase in both absolute terms (the
number of days spent in oversight hearings and meetings
conducted by congressional committees) and as a percentage
of total activity between 1961 and 1983.

In 1961, commit

tees devpted 8.2% of their efforts to oversight activity; by
1983, this activity was absorbing approximately 25.2% of
Congress' attention.5
However, to many congressional observers, including
Aberbach, Foreman, and Dodd,6 although more formal over
sight hearings are now being conducted than at any other
period in our history, activity is generally uncoordinated
and relatively ineffective.
The difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of over
sight is compounded in trying to decide how to detect the
presence or absence of oversight activity in the first
place.

Critical attention to the administration of a feder

al program cannot be determined merely by counting the

5Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eve: The Politics
of Congressional Oversight. (Washington: Brookings Institu
tion, 1990), 35.
6Aberbach, op cit. p. 198; Christopher Foreman, Signals
from the Hill (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1977), 272; Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott, Congress
and the Administrative State. (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1979), 272.
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number of hours Congress devotes to formal hearings.

Lavish

attention to an agency or its programs certainly does not
guarantee that Congress is undertaking a conscientious
effort to determine whether a particular program is in
compliance with legislative intent.

In fact, the reverse

may well be true if committee oversight or reauthorization
hearings are used to bolster support for a pet program or to
capture favorable publicity.

And if, as has often been

suggested, the most effective form of oversight is done
informally— through contacts between legislative staffs and
agency officials— the effect of these largely unpublicized
activities is difficult to observe, much less quantify.
High staff turnover, lack of staff experience in inves
tigative procedures, and the level of technical expertise in
complex areas complicate the oversight process.

A study

conducted by the Congressional Management Foundation indi
cated that two out of three legislative assistants have held
their positions for less than two years.7 Congressional
committees must be willing not only to devote staff resourc
es and time to oversight activities, but to provide training
and expertise to assist staff members in acquiring the skill
necessary to do it.
As the savings and loan and HUD scandals of the 198 0s
amply illustrate, oversight may be hindered by ties between
many committees and special interest groups.

Efforts to

Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies. 14.
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investigate the savings and loan industry were derailed by
industry lobbyists and their allies on the hill (including
former House Speaker Jim Wright), despite 31 reports by the
GAO detailing the scandal.8

If relations between Con

gress, interest groups and the bureaucracy are too cozy,
whistleblowers may be afraid to call attention to problems
within federal agencies and congressional committees may
relax their scrutiny of the executive branch.

Therefore,

although Congress appears to have political•incentives to
i

capitalize on problems within bureaucratic agencies during
an era of divided government, the attack mechanism may well
be tempered by Congress's protective instincts with regard
to favored programs or by the influences exerted by powerful
interest groups on Capitol Hill.

If there is any truth to

the accusation that incestuous ties between federal agencies
and their legislative patrons exist, this situation presents
a fundamental conflict between the legislative watchdog
function and Congress' desire to shield programs it supports
from unfavorable publicity.
Since the 1980s marked a pronounced shift in the spend
ing pattern of the federal government and heralded what is
generally expected to be a permanent era of restricted
federal spending, this decade reflected two often contrast
ing political realities which dominated congressional poli-

8Steven V. Roberts and Joseph P. Shapiro, "The Howl of
Congressional Watchdogs", U.S. News and World Report. Sept.
11, 1989, 26.
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tics.

First, Congress did wish to exert influence over the

administrative structure of federal agencies and subject
them to some measure of direct accountability to the elected
representatives of the people they have been created to
serve.

Presidential appointees such as Anne Burford

Gorsuch and James Watt were viewed as visible examples of
interpreting executive authority in fundamentally different
ways than Congress intended.

Further, especially in the

Democratically-controlled House, there were'substantial
political rewards to be gained from exposing fraud, waste
and efficiency in the executive agencies to embarrass a
Republican administration.

However, if Congress chose to

exercise its oversight function rigorously, it risked under
cutting support for the very programs and agencies it was
trying to shield from White House "budget slashers" like
David Stockman and Richard Darman.

Many members of Congress

were understandably reluctant to jeopardize the existence of
threatened programs supported to a greater extent by a
Democratic Congress than a Republican administration.

Any

short-term political rewards to be gained from calling
attention to agency mismanagement needed to be balanced
against the danger that public support for a program could
erode, which an unfriendly administration could turn to its
own advantage.
The changing political climate with regard to federal
spending thus has significant implications for congressional
oversight which may replace its traditional management

9

function with the need to provide visible support for feder
al programs in an era of divided government.

Since it is

unlikely that the financial situation in Washington will
change substantially during the next few decades, this
thesis concentrated on examining congressional oversight
within the boundaries of the current political realities
rather than from an historic perspective.

While many con

gressional committees chose to deal with the fundamental
conflict' by neglecting their oversight role completely or
adopting advocacy oversight strategies, one investigatory
subcommittee is generally singled out for both praise and
criticism for its vigorous attempts to scrutinize the execu
tive agencies.

That panel, the Subcommittee on Oversight

and Investigations of the House Energy and C.ommerce Commit
tee, chaired by Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), is the focus of
this research.

This paper attempts to examine some of the

circumstances which have made this subcommittee an outlier
in terms of congressional oversight and the incongruence
between staff perceptions of the subcommittee and a somewhat
different view suggested by an examination of available
data.
This thesis examines eight investigations undertaken by
the subcommittee during the 101st Congress.

The 101st

Congress (1988-90) was chosen not only because it was the
most recent, but because it was assumed that staff members
who had been involved with these issues would still be

available and would be able to recall details of the inves-
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tigations.

An attempt was made to include those issues

which generated the most publicity and required a signifi
cant degree of staff effort.

These particular cases were

selected to provide a cross-section of those issues which
reached the formal hearing stage during this period and
reflect the subcommittee1s preoccupation with health and
consumer matters.

Included is one very extensive investiga

tion which involved over ten separate hearings, another
which became highly controversial and the focus for widelypublicized criticism of the subcommittee, and several which
fall within the boundaries of what is generally considered
to be traditional oversight areas.

A complete list of

issues investigated by the subcommittee during this period
is found in Appendix C.
The investigations examined for this thesis include:
1)
2)

3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

charges of fraud and inefficiency in the generic
drug approval process within the Food and Drug
Administration ?
a controversial paper published in a medical jour
nal and the ability of the scientific community
(and the NIH which sponsored the study) to police
itself;
abuses surrounding the sale of insurance policies
designed to supplement Medicare insurance;
an investigation into the safety of the nation's
blood supply in light of possible contamination by
carriers of the AIDS virus;
the effect of the international Montreal Protocol
(which banned substances which deplete the ozone
layer) on American business;
a faulty heart valve manufactured by Pfizer, Inc.,
and the FDA's failure to enforce sanctions against
the manufacturer;
charges that the U.S. Army purchased helicopters
which have never functioned properly and for which
sufficient logistical support is not available;
the effect of unfair foreign trade practices on
American business after the passage of the Omnibus
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Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
Five dependent variables will be reviewed:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

origin of the investigation
the chairman's role in the investigation
subcommittee member participation
partisanship and minority involvement
outcome of the investigations.

Interviews with present and former staff members of the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, appropriate staff
members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the
General Accounting Office, and congressional staff were
conducted during the summer and fall of 1991 to provide
background information on specific investigations and the
operation of the subcommittee.

The names of individuals

contacted are listed in Appendix A.

All quotations without

specific citations result from these interviews.
Additional information was obtained from transcripts of
hearing reports for each of the eight issues as well as
newspaper and magazine articles which involved these issues.
Staff members interviewed for this thesis describe a
nonpartisan subcommittee in which investigations are initi
ated largely by staff members and conducted autonomously.
Although staffers express an obvious degree of admiration
and loyalty for their chairman, for the most part, they
appear to be convinced that staff interests, not those of
the chairman, dominate the oversight agenda.

They also

display a lack of confidence in legislative remedies to
problems uncovered within administrative agencies, maintain
ing that oversight is most effective when it punishes wrong-

12

doers.

To this end, they utilize strategies which enhance

the subcommittee's image as aggressive crusaders and capi
talize on their chairman's reputation as a fierce (and
fearless) opponent.
What emerges from an inspection of the data, however,
suggests a picture of a subcommittee which focuses on the
interests of its chairman and where active participation is
strongest among minority members of the subcommittee while
the majority of the Democrats (with one or two exceptions)
appear to be surprisingly indifferent.

Despite claims to

the contrary, varying degrees of partisan tension surfaced
in at least half of the issues examined.

Further, although

staff members themselves have little regard for legislative
remedies, fully half of the cases resulted in the passage of
additional legislation.

Finally, it appears that the chair

man uses his investigative subcommittee as a forum to influ
ence policy chancre rather than to ensure administrative
compliance with legislative intent.
The contrast between these conflicting images indicates
a serious methodological problem in relying primarily on
interviews with subcommittee staff members and examining
specific cases to generalize about the function of a con
gressional unit.

Although staff members appeared to be

very straightforward in their responses to questions about
the conduct of investigations and the operation of the
subcommittee, this approach involves obvious limitations in
formulating a complete picture of a congressional subcommit

13

tee.
Before examining the dynamics of this subcommittee, it
is critical to establish why it has gained such an impres
sive reputation on Capitol Hill.

To begin with, the task of

the subcommittee has been facilitated because its reputation
as an effective oversight body was firmly established by the
time Dingell inherited it in 1981.

One of the oldest inves

tigatory subcommittees in Congress, it had a long history of
aggressiye probes into regulatory agencies.‘ Staff hold
overs, proven investigatory techniques, generally positive
relations with the press, and the aura which already sur
rounded the subcommittee allowed Dingell and his staff to
capitalize quickly on the accomplishments achieved under
former chairmen, particularly Rep. John Moss (D-CA), with a
minimum of delay.
A number of interrelated circumstances have contributed
to its ability to accomplish significant oversight when so
many other subcommittees have been unwilling (or unable) to
do so.

First, and most important, are the personal charac

teristics, philosophy, and power of its chairman.

Dingell

appears to sincerely believe that the legislative branch is
intended to be the most powerful branch of government and
that the responsibility for good government rests squarely
with it.

He possesses an uncommon degree of institutional

loyalty to the House, and claims to regard the oversight
function as at least as important as passing new legisla
tion.

This view is shared by an experienced, motivated, and

14

aggressive staff.
Dingell has actively tried to lessen partisan tensions
on his committee by encouraging subcommittee members to co
sponsor legislation and acting as spokespersons for issues
under investigation.

Among the staff, congenial relations

based upon mutual respect between investigators and manage
ment have minimized internal conflicts and allowed staff
members to concentrate on issues rather than personnel
problems.

The broad jurisdiction of the committee has been

used to tackle a wide variety of issues and as the subcom
mittee has accumulated a record of highly publicized hear
ings, its reputation has provided a significant degree of
insulation from criticism and political pressure.

Sensitive

treatment of whistleblowers and supportive agency employees
has prompted individuals to cooperate with the subcommittee.
A large budget, including the judicious use of employees
borrowed from other agencies, provide resources which allow
subcommittee staff to pursue multiple, detailed investiga
tions simultaneously.

A reputation for intimidating wit

nesses has "encouraged" cooperation from federal agencies
and organizations involved with the federal government.
Under Dingell's leadership, the committee has gained a
reputation for aggressive pursuit of fraud and mismanagement
in the federal bureaucracy.

But the subcommittee's commit

ment to oversight is a highly personalized commitment,
focused mainly (but not exclusively) on those areas of
primary concern to the chairman, occasionally overstepping

15

the bounds not only of its own committee jurisdiction but
beyond that, into Wall Street, universities and corpora
tions .

CHAPTER II
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Any examination of the effectiveness of the subcommit
tee under Chairman Dingell would be incomplete without some
discussion of the history and reputation of the panel since
its creation over thirty years ago.

Although Dingell's

subcommittee reflects a change in emphasis in national
politics necessitated by the tight budgetary constraints of
the 1980s, its effectiveness has been enhanced by the repu
tation it gained under previous chairmen.
The Formative Period (1957-7 5)

The precursor of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
was a special Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight under
the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce during the 85th Congress.

This special

subcommittee, suggested by Speaker Sam Rayburn in 1957, was
intended to examine the rule-making and enforcement activi
ties of the "Big Six"9 regulatory agencies in light of

9The Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Power Commission,
Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communications Commission,
Securities and Exchange Commission and Interstate Commerce
Commission.
16
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their legislative mandates.

Table 1 lists the chairmen and staff directors of the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee from the creation
of the special committee in 1957 until the present.
Rep. Oren Harris (D-Ark.), Chairman of the full commit
tee, appointed Rep. Morgan M. Moulder (D-MO), as Chairman of
the special subcommittee.

The subcommittee was never given

the power to issue its own subpoenas, control its own bud
get, or for the most part, appoint its own staff.
TABLE 1
SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND STAFF DIRECTORS
Chairman

Staff Director(s)

1957-58
1958-66

Moulder
Harris

1966-75

Staggers

1975-79

Moss

1979-81
1981-present

Eckhardt
Dingell

Schwartz
Lishman (1958-60)
Howze (1961-66)
Lishman (1966-70)
Manelli (1970-5)
Lemov (1975-7)
*
(1977-9)
Raabe (1979-81)
Barrett (19 81-91)
Stuntz
(1991-)

Dates

*Three-man task force structure with no staff director.
members were James Nelligan, John Atkisson, and Lowell
Dodge.

The

Dr. Bernard Schwartz, a man with impeccable academic
credentials but little government experience was appointed
Chief Counsel.

His intention in assuming his post was to do

an "overall, scholarly study of the workings of regulatory

18

agencies— primarily a legal one."10
Schwartz' short and controversial tenure on the subcom
mittee was characterized by his surprisingly aggressive
pursuit of fraud, abuse, and improprieties in the federal
agencies under investigation.

His attempts to hold public

hearings to document charges that FCC commissioners were
submitting duplicate expense accounts and that agency em
ployees had been bribed to grant TV licenses, failed to
apply anti-trust policies, and fostered development of a
patent monopoly in the field of radio and TV broadcasting
were not appreciated by Chairman Harris.

On February 10,

1958, less than seven months after his appointment, the
subcommittee voted 7-4 to dismiss Schwartz as chief counsel.
Moulder, frustrated by Harris' interference in subcommittee
investigations, hampered by the inability of his subcommit
tee to obtain the cooperation of the regulatory agencies in
submitting documents, and strongly supportive of his chief
counsel's efforts to conduct meaningful hearings into what
appeared to be alarming patterns of agency misconduct,
resigned as subcommittee chairman the next day.
After Schwartz' and Moulder's stormy departures, Oren
Harris took over the special subcommittee and chaired it
until his departure from the House in 1966.

During his

tenure, the name of the subcommittee changed to the "Special
Subcommittee on Regulatory Agencies" until 1963 when it was

10Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 18.
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changed again to the "Special Subcommittee on Investiga
tions."

The subcommittee focused its investigative efforts

on FTC issues, particularly the rigging of TV quiz shows
(including the popular "The $64,000 Question), payola in the
music industry and the accuracy and influence of radio and
TV audience ratings.11

In addition, it embarrassed Presi

dent Eisenhower by its probe into a New England business
man's expensive gifts to the president's chief assistant,
Sherman Adams, (a scandal which led to his resignation).
Representative Harley Staggers (D-WV) inherited the
chairmanship of both the full committee and the O&I subcom
mittee when Oren Harris left Congress to become a federal
judge.

Like Harris, who was a conservative, controlling

chairman, Staggers had a tendency to be cautious and suspi
cious and resisted any attempt to decentralize his commit
tee.

In his study of the House and Senate commerce commit

tees, David Price documents a series of struggles and uneasy
truces between Staggers and his more active committee mem
bers which resulted in the development of a legislative
bottleneck at the top of the committee.12
Staggers sought to reinvigorate the subcommittee, whose
funding and staffing had declined under Harris' leadership.
Robert Lishman, who had served as Chief Counsel under Har

11David E. Price, The Commerce Committees: A Study of the
House and Senate Commerce Committees. (New York: Grossman
Publishers, 1975), 309.
12Ibid. 19-20.
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ris, was rehired as staff director, the size of the profes
sional staff was doubled from 6 in 1965 to 12 by 1967, and
several assertive, relatively senior members were added to
the subcommittee membership.13 But Staggers was unable to
match Harris's "iron rule" over his increasingly strident
full committee members or strong-willed subcommittee chair
men who wanted a stronger voice in investigations.

By 1969,

the entire senior half of the full committee, including the
chairman and ranking minority member of every legislative
subcommittee, had seats on the cumbersome investigative
subcommittee.14 Staggers engineered a successful attempt
to reduce the size of his subcommittee and regain control
over the agenda, but committee Democrats became increasingly
dissatisfied with the pace and scope of the subcommittee's
investigative work.

This discontent would erupt into open

revolt in 1975, in the dramatic multi-ballot contest which
cost Staggers the subcommittee chairmanship.
Although it had a relatively substantial percentage of
Commerce staff and a healthy budget, the subcommittee was
largely ineffective.

In spite of Lishman's plans for con

tinual scrutiny of the commissions, except for a concen
trated effort to investigate the Interstate Commerce Commis
sion, most of the subcommittee's work reflected Staggers'

13David E. Price, "The Impact of Reform: The House
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations", in
Leroy Rieselbach, Legislative Reform. (Lexington, MA: Lexing
ton Books, 1978), 134.
14Price, The Commerce Committees. 310.
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preoccupation with communications issues15 and a futile
attempt to cripple CBS.

Other policy areas and agencies

falling under Commerce's jurisdiction were either covered
sporadically or ignored completely.
In general, Staggers' leadership did not lead to a
clear, systematic oversight role.

Price's study concluded

that "the work of the investigative subcommittee betrayed a
tendency to concentrate on individual cases and aberrations
as opposed to patterns of institutional behavior."16
The addition of twelve reform-minded Democratic fresh
men to the Commerce Committee in 1975 provided support for
Rep. John Moss (D-Cal) to defeat Staggers in a seven-ballot
contest for the subcommittee chairmanship.

At the same

time, rules changes were voted in both committee and House
caucus which would increase the authority and resources
available to subcommittee chairmen, reflecting both a keen
dissatisfaction with Staggers' leadership as well as the
escalating trend in the House toward a decentralized commit
tee structure.

Also, Commerce was forced to reorganize its

subcommittees by the shifts in its jurisdiction created by
the Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, which removed
aviation and surface transportation (except for railroads)
from Commerce while adding additional health and energy
jurisdiction.

The net result was that subcommittee lines

15Ibid, 313.
16Ibid, 317.
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were redrawn and another legislative unit was created.
The Moss/Eckhardt Period (1975-81)

Moss' assumption of the subcommittee chairmanship led
to enormous changes in the subcommittee; the membership
tripled, its professional staff was restored to its 1959-60
level, the budget grew by 64% and Moss held as many days of
hearings in the next two years as Staggers had held in the
previous nine:17 from 17 days of hearings in the 91st ConI

gress (1969-70), 16 in the 92nd, and 23 in the 93rd under
Staggers to 71 days in the 94th (1975-6) and 122 in the 95th
under Moss.18
In contrast to Staggers who operated in a "reactive"
mode, Moss courted controversy.

He had a genuine commitment

to oversight, which earned him Ralph Nader's* endorsement as
"the man who perfected oversight".

Yet the topics he chose

for energy oversight in the 94th Congress seem to have been
selected because he was trying to influence his colleagues'
opinions about legislation pending before the Energy and
Power Subcommittee then chaired by John Dingell.19
Moss' first staff director was Michael Lemov, who
suggested that the subcommittee focus on energy, health, and
the performance of independent regulatory agencies.

Moss

17Ibid, 140.
18Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives. (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1979), 133.
19Ibid, 134.
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and Lemov let the issues of natural gas reserves and price
deregulation dominate their energy investigations.

Moss had

a personal interest in establishing that gas companies were
intentionally withholding supplies in anticipation of higher
prices under deregulation, a charge which became difficult
to prove despite persistent efforts of Lemov and his staff.
One investigator, Michael Barrett, dissatisfied with the
direction and focus of what he felt were futile investiga
tions in, this area, resigned his position in protest.20
The subjects of natural gas supplies, reserves and
withholding took up 17 of the 27 days of hearings the sub
committee devoted to energy in the 94th Congress.

Two more

days were spent on Federal Energy Administration enforcement
and three more on other energy subjects.

However, the

subcommittee expanded its agenda to include other subjects,
especially health and regulatory reform.21 A potent weapon
in the Moss arsenal was judicious use of the subpoena.
James Nelligan, Operations Director from 1977-79, claimed in
a congressional workshop on oversight that the subcommittee
once issued 105 of them in a single day.22 During this
period, the subcommittee earned a reputation for attacking
the administration.

In 1975, during an investigation of the

20He guickly found a position with Dingell's subcommittee
on Energy and Power and later returned to the O&I subcommittee
as Staff Director under Dingell.
21Malbin, 145.
22Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations,
96th Congress, December 1, 6, 7, 1978, 131.

24

effects of the Arab oil boycott on American business, Rogers
Morton, then Secretary of Commerce, was cited for Contempt
of Congress when he refused to turn over requested docu
ments.

This marked one of the first times in history that a

cabinet member had been cited for contempt.

Later, the same

subcommittee cited HEW secretary Joseph Califano.
Moss kept most of Staggers' clerical staff and three of
his ten professionals.

He then hired twelve new staffers of

his own,( increasing the size of the professional staff to 22
professionals and 9 clerical staff by 1978.23 In addition,
permanent subcommittee staff members were supplemented by
full committee staff and personnel borrowed from the GAO.
There was a pronounced difference in staff between the
subcommittee chaired by Staggers and the one chaired by
Moss.

Staggers had relied heavily on staff with FBI or

regulatory experience.

In contrast, Moss and Lemov selected

staff from congressional offices, public interest organiza
tions and universities.

They tended to be more conspicuous

ly reformist, more broadly focused on policy questions, more
sensitive to political implications, and more inclined to
carry on their investigations in a public forum.24 Also,
two further kinds of activity were promoted under Moss:
cultivation of the press and the key role of staff members

23Ibid, 136.
24Price, The Impact of Reform, 137.
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as "hearing examiners."25 However, although Moss later
claimed he had an "open door" policy regarding his staff,
many staff members complained that they found it difficult
to get to Moss without going through Lemov and minority
staff complained of obstructionism and unfair treatment.
The focus of subcommittee activities under Moss1 fouryear chairmanship clearly indicates his conception of over
sight in legislative terms.

Investigations were conducted

either t,o influence items already on the legislative agenda
or to introduce issues which might result in legislation.
Moss also maintained the tradition, begun under Harris and
continued under Staggers, of treating the subcommittee as a
"one man show", echoing the style and priorities of its
chairman.

In spite of this domination, most majority mem

bers seemed to be basically well-satisfied with their role
on the subcommittee since Moss was generous in directing
favorable publicity arising from hearings to majority mem
bers to maximize public exposure for their participation (a
courtesy he was far less willing to extend to the minority.
In spite of the name change of the subcommittee in 197 5
from Investigations to Oversight and Investigations and
attempts to broaden its scope, criticisms of subcommittee
activity still focused on the "narrowness" of the work and
failure to perform legitimate oversight of the regulatory
agencies and bureaucracy falling within the jurisdiction of

25Ibid, 143.
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the committee.

Critics complained that too many investi

gations deteriorated into "headline grabbing" at the expense
of substantive policy questions.

Other critics claimed that

Moss' leadership resulted in a bias against industry and
health establishment and agencies perceived to be protecting
their interests.26 Although substantial changes in the
subcommittee occurred since the legislative reforms of the
early 70s and Moss' assumption of the subcommittee chairman
ship in 1975, there were still fundamental problems with
t

translating oversight findings into legislative remedies, no
clear consensus on what issues should be raised, or how
effective oversight should be conducted.
Bob Eckhardt (D-TX) chaired the subcommittee for the
short period after the departure of Moss in 1979.

Under his

leadership, the subcommittee blasted the Interstate Commerce
Commission for rate hikes it allowed railroads to charge for
hauling freight in western, non-competitive routes.

It also

branched off in other directions— investigating the cleanup
of Love Canal near Niagara Falls, acid rain impacts on the
environment, Blue Cross/Blue Shield efforts to pressure for
lower medical costs, excessive charges by real estate and
life insurance agents and household movers, the recodifica
tion of securities law, pricing policies of regulatory
agencies and foreign bribery law charges.

Energy issues

under investigation included EPA/energy gas pricing, the

26Price, The Impact of Reform. 150.
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Superfund, and potential uses of solar energy in urban
centers.27 Eckhardt lost his reelection bid in 1980.
The Subcommittee under John Dingell

(1981-)

Staggers' retirement in 1981 gave John Dingell the
chairmanship of the full committee as well as the Oversight
and Investigations Subcommittee.

Dingell is known as a "New

Deal" liberal who favors civil rights, protectionist legis
lation, consumer issues and, when it doesn't negatively
!

impact the Detroit auto industry, environmental legislation.
He is generally considered to be one of the most powerful
men in Congress and the committee which he chairs, Energy
and Commerce, has claiamed jurisdiction over roughly half
the legislation coming out of Congress.28 He has no reser
vations about extending his reach into other committee
jurisdictions on occasion. As a result, his investigative
subcommittee has held hearings on a wide variety of issues
including financial markets, corporate takeovers, biotech
nology, health insurance, the drug industry, scientific
fraud, nuclear power, telecommunications, accounting prac
tices, food, environmental regulations and defense con
tracts.

It has helped to bring down such Reagan adminis

tration figures as top White House aide Michael Deaver,
Interior Secretary James Watt, and Environmental Protection

27Compiled from pages of the National Journal from 197981.
28See Appendix B for the formal jurisdiction of the
committee.
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Agency administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford.
Like the Moss subcommittee, Dingell's panel plunged
into controversy almost immediately.

Its investigations

into the Environmental Protection Agency, initiated after
tips from disgruntled agency employees, focused on the EPA's
mishandling of the Superfund for hazardous waste cleanup.
That and other scandals eventually led to the resignation of
the administrator and more than a dozen EPA appointees and a
perjury conviction for assistant administrator Rita
Lavelle.29 Called to testify about foreign influence in
Washington, Deaver earned a perjury conviction in 1987 for
his appearance before the subcommittee.
In 1984, the subcommittee began to investigate allega
tions of fraud at General Dynamics, the nation's largest
defense contractor, an activity which took Dingell well
beyond his committee's normal jurisdiction and infuriated
Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin.

Dingell argued

that his committee's oversight responsibility for the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission gave it jurisdiction over
publicly-held corporations like General Dynamics and, in
later investigations, Northrop and McDonnell Douglas.

The

General Dynamics investigation, which originally focused on
submarine contracts and gifts the company had given to
Admiral Hyman Rickover and other military officials, eventu
ally led to the resignation of the firm's chief executive,

29Fred Barnes, "Bad Cop", The New Republic. (October 23,
1989), 11.
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substantial fines against the company, and the cancellation
of multi-million dollar defense contracts.

Dingell's sub

committee charged that General Dynamics had bilked the Navy
out of millions of dollars on ship-building contracts and
unauthorized expenses.30
The subcommittee also conducted an extensive investiga
tion into the activities of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation,
a quasi-government agency with an $88 billion dollar budget
to finance alternative fuel programs.

Large-scale abuses in

this program were uncovered before it was abolished in the
mid-1980s.

Another probe involved Electrospace Systems,

Inc., a defense contractor owned by Chrysler, to determine
whether an Air Force colonel who quit his Pentagon job to
join the firm violated ethics laws by helping to channel
$100 million in business by lobbying former associates.
Justification used to probe the defense industry has
also been extended to include investigations into insider
trading, junk bonds, the savings and loan crisis, and insur
ance company fraud.

Neither the subcommittee nor the Con

gress itself have any formal jurisdiction over the insurance
industry, a technicality which has not prevented hearings
attempting to link insurance fraud, the S&L crisis, and the

30Among the extravagances uncovered was evidence that
thousands of dollars in kennel fees for a dog had been charged
to the federal government, which was also billed for a bed
which General Dynamics installed for its chairman after he
complained that the one which came with the room was unsatis
factory. Jayne Levin, "Have Subpoena, Will Travel", Invest
ment Dealers Digest. (December 17, 1990), 21.

30

junk bond industry through the SEC.

Dingell and his staff

have also tangled with Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, two
of the most visible figures in the high-stakes securities
world, who later pleaded guilty to securities violations,
and scheduled hearings on Ellis A.G., a small Swiss broker
age firm linked to an insider trading network in the U.S.
The subcommittee has been aggressive on trade politics
despite the fact that two other House subcommittees have
more logical jurisdiction over trade issues: Ways and Means
Trade Subcommittee, with jurisdiction over trade agreements,
and the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Eco
nomic Policy and Trade.31 A major participant in drafting
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act, Dingell actively
promotes reciprocal trade agreements which would open for
eign markets to US goods and improve the country's interna
tional trading position.

He has openly criticized the

Reagan and Bush administrations for tolerating what he
considers to be unfair trading practices by Japan, Germany,
and other countries which he charges have benefited from
free trade with the US while imposing restrictions on Ameri
can imports.
The integrity of the subcommittee was severely damaged
in 1988 when an investigator illegally taped a phone conver
sation between John Gibbons of Kroll Associates, a private
investigator working for the subcommittee, and a lawyer

31Christopher Madison, "Dingell's Heat Wave," National
Journal (July 7, 1990), 1657.
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representing a firm under investigation for junk bond and
insider trading.

Brian McTigue, a subcommittee staffer

assigned to the investigation, believing that Gibbons was
working for both the subcommittee and for Drexel Burnham
Lambert Inc., authorized the eavesdrop.

He was subsequently

fired for his unethical behavior but Dingell compounded the
embarrassment by playing the tape at a hearing.
Another major controversy in recent years involves the
series of well-publicized hearings into possible scientific
fraud in a genetic research study partially funded by the
NIH and published in Cell magazine in 1986.

The

subcommittee's aggressive pursuit of the controversy brought
an emotional response from the scientific community which
angrily questioned Congress's role in ascertaining the
integrity of the scientific review process.

Since prominent

scientist and Nobel prize-winner Dr. David Baltimore (ap
pointed president of Rockefeller Institute during the con
troversy)32 was one of the authors of the controversial
paper, the subcommittee suffered a substantial, albeit
temporary, loss of credibility.
In the past decade, the subcommittee has encountered a
barrage of criticism for its disregard for jurisdictional
boundaries, tactics, and attacks on the administration.

The

most common complaint mentioned about the subcommittee is

32He resigned in December, 1991. One of the reasons which
he cited for his resignation was that negative publicity from
this investigation affected his ability to provide effective
leadership.
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that it, and especially its chairman, is a bully.

Fred

Barnes of The New Republic calls Dingell the "meanest and
most feared man in Congress."33 The US News and World
Report, tagging him as "the baddest overseer on the hill",

reports that his colleagues "regard him as an arrogant
power-grabber who thinks nothing of treading on their
turf."34

The Wall Street Journal christened him

"Congress' Grand Inquisitioner"35 in charging that his
subcommittee overstepped its bounds in the Drexel probe.
Reid Stuntz, the current staff director, defends his
boss, insisting that Dingell is certainly not a bully in the
sense that he is usually characterized in the press because
"a bully is feared but not respected.
respected."

Dingell is feared and

He calls him a "throwback to an earlier day,

when right was right, who believes that honest people should
prosper."

A minority staff member says that Dingell is

"pugnacious and doesn't mind a good fight", but doesn't "get
you up there unless he thinks you've done something wrong."
One of his rivals, fellow Democrat Henry Waxman of
California, claims that Dingell enjoys having the reputation
of being powerful and deliberately cultivates his image as a
tough guy.

"When people think you're powerful, you some-

33Barnes, 10.
34"The Baddest Overseer on the Hill," U.S. News & World
Report, (Sept. 11, 1989), 26.
35"J. Edgar Dingell" (editorial) The Wall Street Journal.
(March 15, 1989), A18.
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times become more powerful as a result," he told an inter
viewer in 1988.36
Other critics of the subcommittee contend that the goal
of the investigations is to seek publicity for Dingell and
other subcommittee members, a charge staff and admirers
dismiss.

"Dingell doesn't need the press or power," says

one, "he has that already.

He is definitely secure as a

person in wielding power, but he is not arrogant or uncom
fortable with it."

Says another,

He is kind of romantic in some ways in terms of right
and wrong, though. He has a true sense of outrage.
That is what motivates him, not publicity.
Whether or not he needs the publicity, Dingell and his staff
are adept at leaking some of their juicier tidbits to the
press, a tactic which has led more than one senior adminis
tration and Pentagon official to describe him as a "pain in
the ass"37 and has led to the more serious criticism that
the subcommittee is engaged in overt "administration bash
ing" a charge staff members readily admits may be true but
is not partisan.

Since Dingell's tenure as subcommittee

chairman coincides with three unbroken terms of Republican
presidents, there are logical grounds for the accusation
that the subcommittee focuses on embarrassing the competi
tion.

Those who defend Dingell, however, insist that he is

36Rochelle L. Stanfield, "Plotting Every Move", National
Journal, (March 26, 1988), 794.
37Lee Walczak, "Big John Dingell Keeps Bloodying the
Administration's Nose," Business Week (August 2, 1985), 31.
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concerned with pursuing strong oversight of the administra
tion regardless of its political affiliation and that he
would be just as severe if the Democrats controlled the
presidency.

Until a Democrat captures that office, however,

this hypothesis will be difficult to test.
The subcommittee is also cited for exceeding its reach,
which subcommittee members and staff appear to consider a
compliment.

Several staff members half-jokingly referred to

a satellite photograph of the world which hangs in the
anteroom of the committee hearing chamber as Dingell's
perception of his committee's jurisdiction.38 Dingell
insists he hasn't stretched the committee's jurisdiction
"one millimeter"39 even though he has beaten his more po
litically inert peers to big issues consistently since his
arrival on the committee.
The justification for this, I was told by several staff
members, is that other committees are "owned" by special
interests and do an inadequate or half-hearted job of over
sight and Dingell, in his zeal to police government opera
tions, fills in the gap.

Unlike many other committees,

Energy and Commerce, with broad jurisdiction over so many
issues, has no obvious "paid constituency", an argument
which conveniently overlooks Dingell's obvious ties with the

38Apparently, I didn't receive an "exclusive" on this
observation. It seems to have been shared with most of the
press as I found references to it in nearly every article I
read about Dingell or his committee.
39Barnes, 10.
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automobile industry in his home district.
A senior staffer claimed that Dingell fervently be
lieves in the responsibility of the legislative branch to
oversee the bureaucracy, in contrast to most elected offi
cials who see marginal political rewards in return for a
major investment of time and effort:
Why does he do it? He likes it. But more importantly,
he is genuinely concerned that government work. And he
is angry other members don't show the same concern.
Barrett ,says that once Dingell built up his‘credibility for
his investigations (around 1985), the agencies stopped
fighting.

And because the subcommittee had acquired a

reputation for determined exposure of agency misdeeds, few
congressmen were willing to tackle the powerful congressmen
even when he encroached on their turf.

Barrett's comments

were echoed by the current staff director:
Most people get out of Dingell's way. If they know the
subcommittee is on to something, most people don't want
to go head to head with him. They know by now that he
never backs down.
The issues of jurisdiction and reputation therefore
seem to be mutually reinforcing.

Chairmen of other commit

tees may (and usually do) express public outrage over
Dingell and Company's highly-publicized excursions into
neighboring territory.

But Dingell's political power and

forceful personality, combined with his committee's largely
unblemished reputation for tough, thorough investigations
makes it awkward for committee chairman to challenge their
motivations.

In most cases, Dingell does not appear to be
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interested in a struggle for permanent control of a disputed
area.40 Occasionally, his intervention works to the advan
tage of other committee chairmen.

Aspin was able to play a

stronger hand in confronting defense contractors and the
Pentagon after Dingell's subcommittee began to investigate
defense scandals.

He argued that he had to "get tough" with

military contracts because Dingell and his watchdogs were
waiting in the wings to pounce again if he didn't.41
Sta,ff members do not deny that the subcommittee utiliz
es aggressive, often harsh, tactics to unnerve witnesses or
coax reluctant agency officials into compliance.

The sub

committee employs two legal tactics which many other over
sight units are reluctant to use: the subpoena and requiring
testimony under oath.

Dingell insists that every witness

before the subcommittee be sworn, relying on the threat of
future perjury charges to persuade witnesses to respond
truthfully during questioning.

In addition, Dingell allows

cameras into the hearing rooms; unless a witness specifical
ly asks that the cameras be turned off, the entire hearing
is filmed.

This serves not only to intimidate witnesses but

to guarantee maximum exposure for any particularly startling
revelations which emerge from the hearings.

He also makes

40A notable exception is his desire to wrest jurisdiction
over trade legislation from Ways and Means, particularly its
subcommittee on trade in 1986. He was not successful, but he
didn't exactly lose either.
Most trade legislation is now
handled jointly by both committees.
41Barnes, 11.
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sure that if witnesses invoke their absolute privilege under
House rules not to be filmed, the cameras are not turned off
until after the witness is sworn.

"Look, if they want to

get you on the evening news, they're going to get you on the
evening news," concedes a lawyer who is familiar with
Dingell's hearings.42
Committee rules require that the majority of the sub
committee must vote to issue a subpoena for documents or
witnesses.

If the House is recessed for more than three

i

days, Dingell has the power to issue subpoenas without the
consent of his subcommittee.

However, staffers emphasized

that Dingell rarely does this without at least consulting
the committee's ranking Republican.

Barrett said that

subpoenas are never issued in a blind quest for information:
I always had some (documents) already. They don't know
what you have. Sometimes I had them all and would
subpoena them again anyway. This is to protect the
source and make sure there are no gaps. We never never
went in cold and just asked for what was there.
In part, he says, this was done to establish the degree of
cooperation which the subcommittee could expect.

By knowing

what already existed and then comparing that to what was
submitted in response to a subpoena, investigators could
judge the length the agency would go to cover up its mis
takes.

The moment of subpoena is a critical point for

agencies or firms under investigation.
cooperate or to resist.

The choice is to

But as a former subcommittee staff

42Terence Moran, "Specializing in Dingell," Legal Times
(May 28, 1990), 17.

38

member who now specializes in advising clients under inves
tigation by the subcommittee remarks,
...anybody that thinks the path of resistance is the
best way to approach Dingell or the staff is doing his
client a great disservice. I operate on the premise
that the subcommittee is going to get to the bottom of
everything and that it's better that they hear it from
my client than from somebody else.43
One sign of the subcommittee's effectiveness in inject
ing terror into the hearts of witnesses is the number of
firms which specialize in guiding clients through Dingell's
oversight process.

Lawyers are paid phenomenal fees for the

privilege of sitting mutely in subcommittee hearings while
clients squirm under the heat of camera lights and Dingell’s
relentless grilling.

Unless a lawyer consents to being

sworn in (which nullifies the attorney/client privilege), he
is not permitted to answer a question directed at a witness.
Although all Senate and House committees recognize the right
of witnesses to be accompanied by counsel while testifying,
in Dingell's hearing room, the role of counsel is limited to
advising the witness of his or her rights.
The subcommittee has often been accused of manipulating
the press to generate a receptive public response to issues
under investigation.

In general, subcommittee investiga

tions make good stories and staff members are well experi
enced in dealing with the media, have solid contacts, and
understand the importance of cultivating the media as a

43Patrick McLain of the firm of Rowan and Blewitt. Quoted
in Moran, 16.
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potential ally.
er.

Not all press coverage is favorable, howev

During the Cell paper hearings, the subcommittee

received relentless criticism for its "intrusion into scien
tific matters" as the scientific community rallied in sup
port of one of the paper's prominent co-authors.
Press interest, in spite of a common perception that
subcommittee staff are masters at "working" the press, does
not always result from staff initiative.

The subjects of

many hearings tend to be newsworthy and may attract substan
tial press coverage without any conscious prodding from
subcommittee staff.

One staff member describing an investi

gation into bottled water not expected to generate much
media interest was surprised to find the hearing room jammed
with eight TV cameras and overflowing with spectators.
However, there does appear to be abundant support for
the argument that subcommittee staff (and to a lesser ex
tent, members) frequently manipulate the press to their
advantage.

Staff members, veterans of years of successful

hearings and favorable publicity, are well versed in knowing
what is likely to attract media interest and how to strate
gically leak particularly choice morsels of information at
opportune moments.

Targets of one especially skilled (and

generally uncontrite) investigator often complain of "tor
ture by news leaks" and his penchant for "trading up" infor
mation acquired from one reporter and using it as bait for
more information from another.
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Subcommittee Staff, Leadership, and Resources

Although the budget constraints of the 1980s have
reduced the number of staff members, Energy and Commerce's
annual budget of $5.1 million for investigations and studies
surpasses any in the House. GAO records indicate that it
commits more personnel and spends more travel money in
support of Dingell's panel than it does for the Armed Ser
vices and Ways and Means committees combined.44 At any
given moment, as many as 25 additional GAO personnel may be
involved with O&I staff, which expands both the range and
scope of investigations undertaken by the subcommittee, and
provides a pool of potential recruits when additional perma
nent positions open up on the subcommittee.
Subcommittee staff are characterized by an aggressive
attitude toward their oversight role, an unusually long
tenure and a fierce personal and professional loyalty to
Dingell.

Several, including investigator Peter Stockton and

former staff director Michael Barrett, served with Dingell
when he chaired the Energy and Power Subcommittee.

A sur

prising number of the full-time staff members have been with
the subcommittee since Dingell took over in 1981.

Three of

them were there when he arrived: Debra Jacobson, a veteran
of 12 years; David Nelson (12 1/2), and Steve Sims (15).
Bruce Chafin, who usually teams up with Peter Stockton on
some of the more flamboyant investigations, has been on the

44David Rogers, "Rep. Dingell Wields Wide Power to Probe
Much of US Industry", Wall Street Journal. March 3, 1990, 1.
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staff for over six years.

He and another investigator,

Claudia Beville, are former GAO employees.
This longevity gives the staff a clear advantage in
terms of experience.

Staff members have developed a finely-

tuned "radar" for sniffing out inconsistencies, discrepan
cies, and as they like to point out, "the art of knowing
which rocks to look under."

Experience, claims a former

staff director, is the only way you have to know
...which things are worth going after. There are only
a certain number of hearing days per session. You need
to go after things where you can have an impact and not
waste your time on stuff there is no way to change.
Former staff director Barrett estimated that the sub
committee probably looks at an average of 175-200 issues in
some substantial depth during an average congress.

Out of

that, possibly 50 to 70 of them make it to t‘
he formal hear
ing and/or report stage, representing about 100 hours of
staff work for every hour of hearing.

The current staff

director says that selection of issues for oversight in
volves a certain amount of artistry in picking targets, many
hours of searching in blind alleys, and thorough background
work before a public hearing is scheduled.

Most committees,

he says, have no idea how to "take out" offenders or how to
properly expose things which need to be fixed.
After years of experience at investigative work, these
subcommittee staff members instinctively sense when some
thing just does not "seem right."

The Stanford University

overhead probe currently in the news stemmed from a casual
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glimpse of the university's 72-foot yacht by Chafin and
Stockton who were in California on other business.

When

they returned to Washington, they checked it out.45
Experience is one distinguishing characteristic of
Dingell's investigative team but another, equally vital
component, is their zest for the hunt and appetite for the
jugular.

There is no doubt that this is an unusually ag

gressive group.

They view their investigations in harsh

terms, with "good guys" and "bad guys" (generally they are
the good guys and everybody else is not) and boast of the
number of agency officials and corporate executives who have
lost their jobs as the result of subcommittee inquiries.

In

personal interviews with several staff members, it was clear
that most of them thoroughly relished their roles as watch
dogs over the regulatory agencies and corporations.

Others

were more restrained in their enthusiasm and a few seemed
amused, or even bewildered, by their more ruthless
colleagues.
In all cases, however, this crusading zeal seems to
arise from a genuine commitment to the public interest.

45They discovered that not only was Stanford billing the
government for inappropriate expenses related to the yacht,
but for other costs, such as a $1,2 00 antique commode, a
$10,000 set of donated silverware, floral arrangements, and
$7,000 for new sheets for an enlarged bed for the newlymarried president of the university.
They estimated that
Stanford had overcharged the government from $16 to $2 0
million dollars a year between 1981 and 1990. The institution
is now repaying millions of dollars to the government, facing
additional millions in lost research revenue,and searching for
a new president.
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Staff members regard their role in cleaning up problems in
the agencies or industry abuse as a valuable contribution to
better government.

One of them referred to his job as

... our Peace Corps. We*re not heading off to Africa
to build dams or teach people how to plant corn, but as
far as I'm concerned, this is a way of returning some
thing to society...a lot of Hill staff use their jobs
as career progression...
someone's got to bewilling to
do this on behalf of the American people.
Staffers seem to gauge the impact of their investiga
tions by the "Mom and Pop in Iowa" standard:
i

All we do is to expose the problem. Then we hold a
hearing and invite them to explain what is going on to
Aunt Edna. Go ahead; it doesn't sell. Let them try to
explain it to the people who pay the bills.
To this end, then, they feel justified in extracting maximum
publicity from their hearings

if it serves the purpose of

arousing anger among taxpayers.
Staff effectiveness is bolstered by the continuity of
management during the ten years the subcommittee has been
under its current chairman.

Mike Barrett, Staff Director

and Chief Counsel from 1981-91, was with the Energy and
Commerce Committee for over twenty years.

First hired in

1970 by Bob Lishman when Staggers chaired the subcommittee,
he remained with it when Moss assumed control in 1975.

He

resigned and was picked up by Dingell, then chairman of the
Energy and Power Subcommittee.

When Dingell took over

Oversight and Investigations in 1981, he brought Barrett
with him as Staff Director.
Barrett was an active "hands on" manager, who became
personally involved in a number of investigations as well as
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directing the efforts of the rest of the staff.

He was

particularly instrumental in the Superfund investigations,
defense procurement irregularities, probes into the junk
bond and savings and loan scandals, and accounting profes
sion investigations.

He rarely, he says, attends a decent

sized meeting in Washington without seeing at least one
person he has subpoened.46
Barrett adopted a loose style of leadership, trusting
his experienced and determined staff to conduct their own
investigations with minimum supervision.

He ran interfer

ence for them when necessary, and was kept informed about
the progress of the variety of issues under investigation at
any one time, but did not, as he terms it, "micro manage."
He describes his style as:
...keeping informed about everything, but not in depth.
I tried to talk to everybody about everything. But
these people know what they are doing and they are good
at it. If you tried to manage them too tightly, you
would either lose them completely or end up with some
thing that looks like the GAO.
It seemed to work.

"In all the time I was there, I never

lost anybody I really regretted losing," he claims.

"I was

there less to direct them," he says, "than to
...inspire them. Give them a sense of outrage. I
tried to keep them worked up so they would still ask
questions. I made them take vacations when they needed
them, schedule trips, get out of town.
The present Staff Director is Reid Stuntz, who moved

46Tom Kenworthy, "Wearing Rejection as a Badge of Honor:
A Carrier of Angst, Former Hill Prober Doesn’t Get Usual Job
Offers," Washington Post. (April 3, 1991), A21.
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into the leadership position this past spring.

A former

partner in a law firm and prominent prosecuting lawyer,
Stuntz has been with the O&I subcommittee since 1988 and
played a prominent role in the generic drug investigation.
He indicated that he intends to follow Barrett's "traffic
cop" management style, shaping investigations but leaving
the detailed investigative work to his experienced staff.
None of the staff members I interviewed voiced any com
plaints about either Barrett or Stuntz.

The absence of

overt staff/management conflict and the benign management
style which has characterized the staff working environment
for the past ten years has contributed to the ability of the
staff to focus on investigations rather than distracting
internal power struggles or disputes.
Staff members speak in glowing terms about Dingell's
loyalty to them and unanimously credit the success of the
subcommittee to his leadership, support, and integrity.
They consider him to be unique in Congress for his genuine
commitment "to make government work", a theme which recurs
in their own explanations for why they remain on the staff.
Dingell's power provides both insulation for the staff from
political pressure and leverage with reluctant witnesses.
They openly praise his willingness to tackle tough issues,
even ones which may hurt him personally. For example,
Bell Textron is the largest defensecontractor in his
district. He investigated them. His brother works at
NIH, which he has gone after. GM owns Hughes Aircraft.
He investigated them too.
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A former staff director described Dingell's commitment
to oversight in these terms:
He believes in the integrity of government. At various
times he has subpoenaed GM, Ford, and Chrysler. Friends
get no special treatment, no special favors. I guaran
tee there is no other member in the institution like
that. One investigation cost him a personal friend
ship. TRW's head of their Washington office was a close
personal friend of Dingell and Debbie's. Not any more.
Another staff member said that "Dingell doesn't flinch from
investigating things that need to be investigated."

Yet

another said that Dingell's trust in staff members' ability
to do a good job was their "quality control."
If you (screw) up, you leave. The quality control is
that you decide your job is on the line in each inves
tigation. We don't get blindsided. There is no quali
ty control between us and the chairman. The only way
he can operate like he does is that he has to have a
lot of faith in us.
In spite of adamant comments that Dingell would not
hesitate to pursue an investigation that could harm him
politically or personally, staff members seemed reluctant to
force the issue.

One of them said that she would be unwill

ing to do "auto stuff" because that would put Dingell on the
spot.

They appear to be sensitive to issues which might

reflect negatively on their chairman, as in the case of the
blood supply probe which attacked a popular American insti
tution (the Red Cross) and attempt to warn him that an
investigation might be leading into politically dangerous
waters.

Unspoken, although strongly implied, was the idea

that the probe would be killed if Dingell had not given the
green light to proceed.

Even so, although staff members

47

universally report that Dingell's characteristic response
when faced with the possibility of damaging criticism is
only "Are we right?

Then go ahead.", it is clear that they

are nevertheless concerned about how their investigations
may reflect upon their chairman.

On the one

hand,they

genuinely admire Dingell's willingness to put truth and
justice above politics.

However, his position transfers the

burden of protection from Dingell to the staff.

Most of

them seem to resolve this dilemma by avoiding issues which
affect Detroit or could cause Dingell problems at home.
Some staffers appeared to be disturbed that their coworkers
would pursue issues which put Dingell in a bad light, espe
cially the McTigue incident which compromised both Dingell's
integrity and that of his staff and to a lesser extent, the
Cell investigation, which unleashed months of bitter attacks
on Dingell and his team.
As a congressional staff aide observed:
If you have a good relationship with the staff and
there is an issue your member is interested in and you
want them to look at, there is a good chance they will
do it. But if we wanted to do oversight on clean air,
for example, I don't think they'd touch it.
You would
run into a big brick wall very quickly.
Staffers respond that they have often investigated
issues which affect Michigan, including the largest defense
contractor in Dingell's district.

They are quick to point
i

out that the University of Michigan was one of the first
institutions investigated for overhead violations, his alma
mater (Georgetown University) was called on the carpet on an
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energy issue, and that even Dingell's closest friends have
been investigated by the subcommittee.

However, there is

still a noticeable reluctance to apply the same tough over
sight standards to issues affecting the Detroit auto indus
try that the subcommittee applies to other areas.
The impression of the subcommittee which results from
conversations with staff members is one of respect for the
chairman, minimum interference from staff management, and an
energetic, intelligent staff characterized by less turnover
and more experience than most congressional units.

CHAPTER III
ORIGIN OF INVESTIGATIONS

This chapter will examine eight specific issues inves
tigated by the subcommittee which reached the hearing stage
during the 101st Congress.

Staff members were asked whether

specific investigations resulted primarily from staff ini
tiative, at the request of the staff director, from a re
quest from the chairman or other subcommittee member, or
from concerns raised by whistle-blowers or other individu
als .
Generic Drug Approval Process

In July of 1988, the subcommittee began its investiga
tions into what Chairman Dingell has called "the most perva
sively corrupt" FDA scandal his panel has ever investigated
upon receipt of evidence from a generic drug manufacturer,
Mylan Laboratories of Pittsburgh, PA, which raised serious
questions about the integrity of the FDA's generic drug
approval process.

Ten hearings held before the subcommittee

in the 101st Congress described a widespread pattern of
discrimination, favoritism and inconsistency among of some
FDA employees and illegal activity on the part of some of
the largest generic drug manufacturers in the country.
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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 resulted in an acceleration of the number of
generic drug reviews and time periods for reviewing and
approving new generic drugs.

Although drug applications

were theoretically to be assigned and approved on a "first
in, first out" basis, Mylan complained that their drug
approvals were being deliberately stalled because of favor
able treatment shown to their competitors by a chemistry
review branch chief and his subordinates.

Their repeated

complaints to the director of the generic drug jdivision and
t'

other FDA officials met with no response.

Finally, in

desperation, the corporation turned to a private investiga
tor who uncovered convincing evidence of corruption and
mismanagement47 and brought this information, in stages, to
staff members of the Oversight and Investigations subcommit
tee.

Convinced about the credibility of Mylan's concerns

and abuses within the FDA, the staff director's enthusiastic
support was influential in attracting the interest of Chair
man Dingell.

A staff member on this investigation comment

ed,
A lot of investigations begin with someone with self
interest trying to get free discovery; you have to do a
certain amount of checking before you decide it's worth
acting on. Mylan crossed this critical point fairly
early. Barrett thought it was hot. Dingell became
excited because Barrett was excited.

47Among other things, the investigator inspected the
trashcans outside the residence of the official under suspi
cion. A US attorney later described the prima facie case that
the Mylan investigator established as "as good as anything
coming out of the FBI."
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As the investigation proceeded, staff members found other
manufacturers willing to testify that they had suffered
discrimination during the drug approval process and tangible
evidence of bribes and suspicious behavior on the part of
several industry representatives and division officials.
Scientific Misconduct

The subcommittee's investigation into charges of inac
curacies and possible fraud in a scientific paper proved to
be one of the most controversial ever initiated by the O&I
subcommittee.

Its involvement stemmed from a complaint by

Tufts researcher Dr. Margot O'Toole that a paper co-authored
by her supervisor, immunologist Dr. Thereza Imanishi-Kari,
appeared to contain inaccurate data pertaining to a crucial
portion of an experiment described in the paper.

The arti

cle appeared in a 1986 scientific medical journal Cell, and
was co-authored by six researchers then at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, including Dr. David Baltimore, a
Nobel prize winner later appointed president of Rockefeller
University.

Funding for the research was provided by the

National Institutes of Health.
Dr. O'Toole voiced her concerns about the data to Dr.
Imanishi-Kari and to senior faculty at Tufts University
(where Dr. O'Toole had received her Ph.D. and Dr. ImanishiKari was expected to assume a faculty position in a few
months), to faculty members at MIT, and later to officials
of the NIH.

An informal review conducted at Tufts concluded
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that Dr. O'Toole was justified in her concerns but that a
formal correction would damage Dr. Imanishi-Kari's career.
She testified before the subcommittee that she was told that
there were already so many faulty papers in print that one
more didn't make much difference.
MIT requested a formal memo outlining her charges,
which she provided, and arranged a formal meeting between
her and key co-authors.

Dr. Baltimore acknowledged that he

had not reviewed Dr. Imanishi-Kari's experimental results
and did not intend to because it would imply a lack of trust
in his collaborator.

The MIT panel noted some discrepancies

in the data but concluded that a correction was unnecessary.
The issue was brought to the attention of the NIH by a
graduate student in Dr. Imanishi-Kari's laboratory.

An

independent NIH panel found nothing to suggest fraud or
misrepresentation but raised concerns about errors and
ambiguity.

Two NIH investigators (Walter Stewart and Ned

Feder)48 who were not satisfied with the panel's conclu
sions continued to pursue the case.
The subcommittee became involved after Stewart and
Feder informed them of Dr. O'Toole's dissatisfaction with
the scientific review process at the two universities and
with NIH reaction to the dispute.

48Dr.
letter as
expense."
Magazine.

Baltimore later described these employees in a
"nuts who are trying to keep themselves busy at our
Phillip Weiss, "Conduct Unbecoming", New York Times
October 29, 1989, 68.
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Medigap Insurance

The impetus for the hearings into private insurance
coverage to supplement Medicare coverage for the elderly
arose from the long-term interest which Chairman Dingell and
Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR) have shown in both the insurance
industry and issues affecting senior citizens.

Congress

made its first tentative steps into regulation of insurance
policies designed to cover the gaps in Medicare coverage in
1980 when it set out minimum standards for these policies in
the Baucus amendments, a voluntary program which allowed
policies to be certified by the federal government.

Howev

er, Dingell and Wyden both felt that these measures were
inadequate and attempted to tighten Medigap requirements
again in 1988 in provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act which were not repealed along with the rest of
that law in 1989.49

Discussions around the time of the

bill and new reports of abuse in insurance policies prompted
Dingell to request an investigation into the issue.
The subcommittee conducted an investigation which
culminated in a public hearing on April 26, 1989, to examine
systemic patterns in the way health insurance for the elder
ly is sold and regulated.

The subcommittee was particularly

concerned with the effectiveness of the current regulatory
structure which relies on voluntary compliance with a nebu

49Julie Rovner, "Congress Tightens Regulation of Medigap
Insurance Plans", Congressional Quarterly. (November 3, 1990),
3720.
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lous system of federal standards.
Committee hearings exposed numerous problems with the
manner in which insurance companies are regulated by the
various states, which exercise varying degrees of effective
ness in reviewing industry practices and examining consumer
complaints.50

This hearing appeared to be designed to

attract attention to problems with Medigap of insurance and
to increase support for federal regulation.
Blood Supply Safety

According to the staff member involved with this issue,
the investigation into the safety of the nation's blood
supply was a direct result of the erosion of confidence in
the Food and Drug Administration after the subcommittee's
probe of the generic drug approval process uncovered major
fraud and inefficiency in the organization.

Since the

subcommittee had found problems in other divisions of the
FDA aside from the Generic Drug Division (brand name drugs,
bottled water, medical devices, etc.), the staff member was
concerned about whether adequate safeguards existed to

50Witnesses testified that elderly policy holders purchase
multiple insurance policies which provide very little addi
tional coverage in return for substantial premiums. Cases of
people purchasing 25 or 30 policies over five years were
cited, a result of the differential commission structure
(called "twisting'' in the industry) which pays higher commis
sions on new policies than existing ones.
In one example
given during the hearings, an alcoholic woman bought 28
separate policies between Oct. 1985 and April 1988 at an
annual cost of approximately $5,865 but received no payments
for medical expenses she incurred while hospitalized for
treatment of her condition.
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protect the nation's blood supply from infectious diseases,
particularly since the incidence of the AIDS virus has
reached epidemic proportions.

However, one national report

er indicated that the investigation resulted from Dingell's
comments to the staff about his concern for the nation's
blood supply after a hip operation a few years ago.51
Ozone Layer Depletion

A subcommittee hearing was conducted on May 15, 1989,
t

to examine the impact on American businesses of the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted
in December of 1987 to inhibit the production, consumption,
and trade in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and bromine-contain
ing compounds (halons). Chairman Dingell, who has widely
criticized policies which put American busin'ess at a compet
itive disadvantage in a global economy, was sensitive to the
issue that U.S. industry might suffer from attempting to
comply with the terms of the Protocol, particularly if
inexpensive and easily available substitutes for CFCs and
halons cannot be found.52
Revisions to the Protocol were being negotiated at time
of the hearings and Dingell was concerned not only that
environmental groups were aggressively lobbying for stricter

51Harrison Rainie, "Congress's Most Feared Democrat, " U.S.
News and World Report. August 26/September 2, 1991, 53.
52Although 40 countries and the EEC have ratified the
Protocol, over 80 developing nations, including Brazil, China,
Argentina, India, and Korea, have not.
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standards, but that the Environmental Protection Agency
might be pressured into premature approvals of proposed
substitutes without adequate investigation into the safety,
performance, and economic aspects of these substances.53
The hearings reflect Dingell's cautious approach to
environmental legislation, as well as his well-documented
concern over America's competitive position in the interna
tional economy.

Dingell's control over this investigation

was obvious by his selection of a staff member from the full
committee staff to handle it; his views on environmental
issues are known to be identical to Dingell's.
Medical Device Industry

On February 26, 1990, the subcommittee began hearings
to determine the Food and Drug Administration's ability to
monitor the approval and marketing of medical devices.
Although several case studies were investigated, most atten
tion was given to Pfizer Corporation's Bjork-Shiley Convexo
Concave heart valve54 which had been approved by the FDA
and marketed between 1979 and 198 6 before it was recalled by
the manufacturer.
A subcommittee staff member first became aware of

53So far, all acceptable substitutes for CFC refrigerants
have resulted in a loss of energy efficiency. Other substi
tutes which the EPA has recommended have proven to be toxic or
highly inflammatory. Many critics of the Protocol anticipate
that manufacturers will turn to foreign firms not bound by the
terms of the agreement to purchase parts and supplies.
54Shiley, Inc. was the manufacturer of the valve.
is the parent corporation.

Pfizer
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problems with the heart valve through a tip from a Legal
Times writer who mentioned that a number of individuals in

Australia had experienced heart failures attributed to the
device and that it had been the subject of an investigation
by a Canadian television station.
The hearing (and report issued on the same day) focused
on FDA weaknesses in the compliance with and enforcement of
the Medical Device Amendments, including its failure to
aggressively monitor (and later suspend) manufacturing
operations until a solution to the problem could be identi
fied.

The investigation also focused on Pfizer's continued

marketing of the device even after company officials became
aware of problems in its design and manufacture as well as
its failure to notify the FDA of potential problems in spite
of numerous product recalls and modifications.
Army Helicopter Procurement

In April and May of 1990, the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations conducted hearings on the $13 billion
Army attack helicopter, the Apache AH-64 manufactured by
McDonnell Douglas.
Army in 1984.

The first units were delivered to the

At the time of the hearings, the Army was

planning the purchase of its final 13 2 helicopters (at a
cost of $1.5 billion), for a total of 807 Apaches.
Subcommittee staff first learned of problems with the
Apache through a letter which a colonel of the Airborne
Calvary Unit sent to his commanding officers complaining of

performance problems he encountered during a routine training exercise.

During the exercise, each of the twenty

Apaches assigned to the unit either malfunctioned or was not
operational at the time.

In his letter, the frustrated

colonel stated that if he had to go to war, he would prefer
to take the Vietnam-era Cobras rather than gamble on the
performance of the Apache.

A copy of this letter was

slipped to the subcommittee, which then collected a few
other documents and requested the GAO to look into the
allegations.

After a ten-month GAO investigation, the

subcommittee scheduled a hearing to highlight ongoing prob
lems with the equipment and difficulties the Army had en
countered in maintaining it.

The investigation was part of

an ongoing effort to expose contractor abuses in the defense
industry.
Unfair Foreign Trade Practices

Subcommittee hearings during the 101st Congress were a
continuation of a long-standing inquiry into foreign trade
practices and reflect Chairman Dingell's attitude about the
need for effective legislation to protect American business.
The focus of the 1989 hearings was on the legal environment
created by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, a product of eight separate full Committees in the
House alone.

The 1990 hearings also emphasized issues to be

discussed during the impending GATT negotiations.
Witnesses in the private sector representing the tele
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communications, pharmaceutical, steel, motion picture and
automobile industries testified that the Act had failed to
open new international markets to American products and that
intellectual property rights violations had hurt US industy.
Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher and U.S. Trade Repre
sentative Carla Hills both testified before the subcommit
tee, and industry representatives criticized the government
for the absence of a coordinated trade policy.
Hearings on trade issues seem aimed at keeping trade
issues alive and on the agenda.

According to a staff member

responsible for trade matters, the hearings:
...keep the fire going. We have more than enough
legislation already. Hearings are more to pressure the
administration to implement the legislation as toughly
as they should and to keep the heat on foreign competi
tors... they closely watch what we do. We keep in touch
with them, in part through hearings. There's an audi
ence out there; we send messages to them where appro
priate. We do play on a world stage.
Summary
The selection for subjects of these particular investi
gations appears to be fairly evenly divided between those
issues which Chairman Dingell has been consistently associ
ated with and those which appear to be the result of indi
vidual staff initiative, primarily as the result of informa
tion obtained from whistle-blowers or contacts.

Dingell's

on-going preoccupation with trade, environmental and insur
ance issues resulted in three investigations.

The probe

into helicopter procurement, although prompted in this

specific instance by a complaint channelled to a staff
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member, was part of a continuing effort to expose defense
contractor abuse, which Dingell has actively supported for
most of the years he has chaired the subcommittee. Four
issues, therefore, directly reflect the chairman's interest
in specific subject areas.

In two of them (Medigap and the

ozone layer), he used staff assistance from the full commit
tee rather than from the investigative subcommittee.
Three issues appeared to result primarily from staff
initiative upon receipt of information from’whistleblowers
or other contacts.

The origin of the final issue (blood

supply safety) is not clear.

Although the staff member

involved in the investigation indicates that he was primari
ly responsible for the probe, there is some evidence that
Chairman Dingell also expressed an interest in the issue.
Without accurate information about the timing of their
respective questions, it is impossible to accurately deter
mine whether the impetus for this particular investigation
arose with the chairman or one of his staff.
Table 2 lists the source for the eight cases selected
for study in this paper.

61

TABLE 2
SELECTION OF CASES FOR INVESTIGATION
Investigation

Source

Generic Drug Approval Process

Whistleblower (Mylan
Laboratories, Pgh, PA)

Scientific Misconduct

Margot O'Toole, via NIH
employees Walter Stewart
and Ned Feder

Medigap Insurance Abuse

Interest expressed by
subcommittee members
Dingell and Wyden

i

Ozone Layer Depletion

Chairman Dingell

Medical Devices

Tip from reporter

Army Helicopter Procurement

Anonymous letter from
Army employee; part of
on-going investigation
into defense industry

Unfair Foreign Trade Practices

Chairman Dingell

Blood Safety Supply

Unclear - staff initia
tive or Chairman Dingell

CHAPTER IV
ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Most scholars argue that oversight subcommittees and
investigations tend to reflect the interests and priorities
of committee chairmen.

In spite of staff comments that this

subcommittee is "staff driven", the subcommittee under
Chairman Dingell appears to be no exception.

Although the

Chairman allows the staff a great deal of latitude in the
conduct of actual investigations, his own agenda appears to
guide the selection of topics as well as the course of the
investigations.
In 1987, as reports of insider trading shook the secu
rities industry, John Dingell accepted a fee to deliver an
address to a group of security firm senior executives.

His

brief appearance was hardly reassuring:
This is not a speech in praise of the integrity of the
securities industry, dismissing you to go off to cock
tail parties and continue as before. And don’t bother
telling me, "Dingell, it can't be done" because if you
don't immediately set to putting your houses in order,
it will be done for you and to you.55
It was, however, a typical Dingell performance— brusque,
blunt, and belligerent.

55Jack Torry, "The Alligator: Mean, Smart, Tough, and
Blunt— Meet Big John Dingell of Michigan," The Blade (Toledo,
OH), (April 24, 1988), B-3.
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John Dingell first arrived in Washington as a sevenyear old when his father, John D. Dingell, Sr., was first
elected to Congress in 1932.

His father, a New Deal Demo

crat, was one of the first big-city Polish-Americans elected
to the House.

He served eleven terms, helped to write

Social Security legislation, and was one of the sponsors of
legislation which created the National Institutes of Health,
an agency now under his son's jurisdiction.

The young

Dingell worked as a page in the Capitol, earned a law degree
from Georgetown University, and (at the age of ?29) won a
special election to replace his father when he died in 1955.
"He is," says former staff director Mike Barrett, "more of a
creature of the House than anybody I can ever conceive of."
He is fiercely loyal to the House and has turned down numer
ous offers to run for the Senate.
As an imposing figure (6 feet 3 inches, 210+ pounds),
he has earned the nickname "Big John" (sometimes "the
Truck") and calls himself both a moderate Democrat, and "the
last of the New Dealers."

He likes to describe himself as a

"poor Polish lawyer from Detroit" but for more than three
decades, he has used his bluntness, intellect and the force
of his personality to fight his way into one of the most
powerful positions in Washington.
Although it is frequently said that Dingell has a safe
district (his only tough fight was a primary race in 1964;
in 1988, he won reelection with 97% of the vote), his
district's voters can be fairly unpredictable.

Although the
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Wayne County portion of his district (the 16th), is one of
the most Democratic areas in Michigan, his district also
includes white-collar residents and company managers as well
as a staunchly conservative rural contingent, all of whom
tend to vote Republican.56 In the last presidential elec
tion, his district voted 54% for Bush? in 1984, the figure
was 64% Republican.

Although it is not inconceivable that

when Dingell retires he could be replaced by a Republican,
there iq no doubt that he has the overwhelming support of
his district.

His district may not be entirely secure but,

for as long as he wants it, his seat certainly appears to
be.
Since Dingell's district includes Dearborn and the huge
Ford plant at River Rouge, he is (predictably) a fierce
protector of the auto industry, advocating import quotas on
automobiles manufactured overseas and fighting stringent
auto-emission rules and improved fuel economy standards.
In spite of his long ties to the auto industry, he is a
conservationist on wildlife habitat and federal park legis
lation.

He sponsored both the National Environmental Pro

tection Act of 1969 and Endangered Species Act of 1973, yet
environmentalists tagged him "Dirty Dingell" for his efforts
to undo the Clean Air Act.

Ralph Nader, who once praised

him as a fellow conservationist, now calls him "the
consumer's worst enemy" after he opposed stiffer auto safety

56 Phil Duncan (ed), Politics in America-102nd Congress.
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991), 767.
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and pollution requirements.57 Dingell shrugs off the crit
icism by reminding his attackers that he was "not sent here
to destitute my district or destroy the auto industry."58
Despite a high ADA rating and a reputation as a liberal
populist, he is an opponent of gun control legislation and a
board member of the NRA.
Although he tends to support consumer issues, particu
larly health-related ones, he opposes health and safety
regulations which he thinks will unduly tax’steel and auto
manufacturers.

Dingell is currently backing proposals to

change product liability legislation, siding with manufac
turers who prefer federal product liability laws over having
to deal with fifty separate state laws.

However, manufac

turers want new legislation to replace the current strict
liability standards holding manufacturers responsible with a
"negligence standard" which provides more protection for
industry.

Dingell supports this direction, charging that

lawyers are the only group which benefit from strict liabil
ity statutes.

Although he defends his position by claiming

that a revision of the laws would ultimately benefit consum
ers, the fact that the auto industry is the frequent target
of product liability lawsuits undoubtedly affects his deci
sion.
Dingell has a reputation for reinforcing his power by

57Anna Cifelli, "Capitol Hill's
Fortune. (February 18, 1985), 123.
58Barnes, 12.

One-Man

Gauntlet,"
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rewarding allies and punishing enemies, but it is difficult
to judge whether his actions constitute strong arm tactics
or merely the adroit use of a chairman*s prerogatives.

His

dislike of James Scheuer (D-NY), who ranks second in senior
ity on the full committee, has made it impossible for
Scheuer to retain a subcommittee chairmanship.

When Dan

Kildee, a fellow Michigan Democrat, voted against a Dingellsponsored bill in 1982, Dingell shouted to him across the
crowded Mouse floor, "Kildee, I

hope you're satisfied with

your current committee assignment."

Kildee, who was trying

to get on Ways and Means at the time, still has not made
it.59

Leon Billings, a former aide to Sen. Edmund Muskie

of Maine, opposed Dingell on the Clean Air Bill.

Years

later, during an unsuccessful campaign for Congress, he ran
into Dingell, who abruptly informed him that he wanted him
to know that he would do everything he could to make certain
that he was not elected.60
Dingell often operates through a junior committee
member, permitting that member to introduce a bill while he
runs political interference for it.

He claims this practice

is intended to "educate" a new generation of skilled young
legislators who can continue to carry on the legacy of
public service.

Cynics point out that it also multiplies

the number of issues he can work on, extends his range, and

59Barnes, 12.
60Torry, 3.
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builds a power base of grateful younger members.61 His
normally successful attempts to solicit bipartisan sponsors
for legislation builds coalitions and effectively minimizes
partisan conflict on his committee.

He is generally consid

ered to be more effective in committee than on the floor.
His greatest strength is considered to be his skill at
coalition building and deal cutting.

A crucial element in

this strategy is his alignment with committee Republicans to
advance .legislation he supports over the objections of
fellow Democrats.

In a recent markup of the Clean Air Act

reauthorization in the Health subcommittee, six Republicans
and three Democrats voted with Dingell for amendments and
seven Democrats and two Republicans voted with Waxman
against them, killing them in a tie.

During another vote on

product liability legislation, all seventeen committee
Republicans voted with him, while only three of the
committee's 24 Democrats were on his side.62 In spite of
his liberal/populist rhetoric and inherited New Deal pedi
gree, in reality he is a moderate Democrat who frequently
has more in common with Republicans than fellow Democrats.
Tensions often run high between Dingell and some of his
subcommittee chairmen and fellow committee chairman.

Henry

Waxman, who heads the Subcommittee on Health and the Envi
ronment, frequently opposes Dingell's attempts to weaken

61Stanfield, 794.
62Ibid, 794.
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auto emission controls.

They battled several years ago over

proposed acid rain restrictions and have often tangled over
provisions of the Clean Air Act.

Yet they are in agreement

on health issues and their alliance is credited with main
taining the federal health budget in face of dramatic cuts
for other programs over the past decade.

A pragmatic poli

tician, he has been quoted as saying that he will work with
anybody and everybody that comes along if he can do it
honorably and they are going in the right direction.63
Dingell clashed with former subcommittee chairman James
Florio over the Superfund, and opposes fellow committee
members Norman Lent on acid rain issues and Ron Wyden on
environmental matters.

As already mentioned, he frequently

antagonizes other committee chairmen over his widely-publi
cized excursions into their jurisdictional territory.
Dingell usually justifies his encroachment by thinly dis
guised exercises in creative logic.
For example, the investigation into salmonella in eggs
undertaken during this Congress resulted because a staff
member became concerned about the high rate of salmonella in
chickens.
We had no jurisdiction over agriculture so we couldn't
go after chicken, which fell under USDA jurisdiction.
But the FDA has jurisdiction over eggs, and we have
jurisdiction over the FDA. So we had a salmonella
hearing on eggs, which we had jurisdiction over, but
not chicken. We were really concerned about chickens
but got our point across with the eggs.

63Stanfield, 795.
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Staff members seemed to have no qualms about crossing juris
dictional borders in pursuit of wrongdoers and frankly admit
that the subcommittee "steps on toes" when necessary.

One

staff member's attitude about criticism of his panel's
efforts was clear:
We have the physical capability and the power base to
do it. With Dingell, we have the wherewithal, the
capability, and the willingness. Other committee
chairmen have the capability, but not the willingness.
Barrett remarked that Henry Waxman, Chairman of the
»

Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, did not like the
generic drug investigation, but never tried to get the
subcommittee to stop it.

Dingell's reputation for playing

rough, he said, minimized potential opposition and protected
the oversight staff from political pressure from the subcom
mittee or full committee members.
Energy and Commerce shares jurisdiction on trade issues
with the Ways and Means Committee which is responsible for
tariffs.

However, they work independently, apparently

because of obvious differences in philosophy on trade is
sues.

Says one staff member,
Ways and Means is more free trade than we are. Our
strategy in the 1988 trade acts was to get some trade
legislation; Ways and Means didn't really want to do
it. We ended up with joint referral. An awful lot of
what we did was preparing ground and forcing people to
confront reality. The subcommittee went overseas,
threatening and pushing, meeting with foreign industri
alists.
But Dingell's power grabs have met with increasing

resistance in recent years.

The headline-grabbing question

in a "Dear Colleague" letter circulated by Public Works
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leaders asked congressmen "Has the Energy and Commerce
Committee Ever Tried to Steal Your Jurisdiction?"64 In
October 1987, the House rejected a provision of a FTC bill
to transfer oversight of airline advertising from Public
Works to Energy and Commerce which had been vigorously
opposed by Public Works Chairman James Howard (NJ).

In a

"surf and turf" fight during 1990, Dingell angered Agricul
ture Chairman E. De La Garza (TX) when he succeeded in
transferring regulatory authority inspection for shellfish
to the FDA.65 But his fellow congressmen are not immune
from exploiting Dingell's jurisdictional appetite when it
suits their purposes.

Former House Banking Committee Chair

man Ferdnand St. Germain once yielded jurisdiction knowing
that Energy and Commerce would slow down a bill he thought
was moving too fast in his own committee.66
In recent years he has suffered a stinging defeat on
the revised Clean Air Bill, which he managed to stall for
over nine years before reluctantly supporting it in 1990.
He lost another major battle over the FCC decision to drop
the fairness doctrine requirement from their regulations.
Dingell proposed legislation to keep it which passed but was
subsequently vetoed by President Reagan.

He had his propos

al attached to the budget bill a year later, but it was

64Duncan, 768.
65Ibid, 768.
66Rogers, 1.
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dropped in a final attempt to get the legislation through.
Dingell's personal interest in his oversight subcommit
tee is readily observable.

He attended all but two of the

24 separate hearings covered under this research, for a 99%
attendance record overall.

The two hearings he missed were

two short and fairly unimportant generic drug hearings.

A

brief description of his participation in each case follows.
Generic Drug Investigation
Although the impetus for the probe into the generic
drug approval process originated with staff members, Dingell
quickly became enthusiastic about the investigation as
convincing evidence appeared regarding the magnitude of
abuses within the FDA.

His involvement deepened as it

became obvious that the scandal extended far beyond the
approval stage alone and the generic drug industry manufac
turing practices came under suspicion.

He took an active

role in prompting criminal proceedings against FDA and
industry officials and quickly became the target of angry
newspaper advertisements sponsored by a company under suspi
cion.

He angrily demanded the names of FDA employees who

ordered a surprise inspection of Barr Laboratories shortly
after its president testified that it had also suffered
discriminatory treatment during the approval process.

The

inspection was canceled (with appropriate apologies).
Acknowledging that under current law, the FDA did not
have the authority to penalize companies which engaged in
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questionable activities, Dingell recognized that the FDA
would need "a sharp new set of enforcement teeth" to "put
misery on the scoundrels who are doing these things."67
His emphasis during the course of the investigation shifted
noticeably from oversight of the FDA to legislative remedies
to address the problem.
Scientific Misconduct

According to staff members, Dingell did not foresee the
furor wh'ich would erupt over the Cell paper, did not antici
pate that it would require a second hearing, and
...took a lot of heat for it as Baltimore rallied the
scientific community and launched a direct attack at
Dingell and the right of the government to become
involved in scientific issues.
While Baltimore complained that he was being "hounded"
by Dingell and NIH investigators Stewart and Feder, many
scientists considered the case as an attack on science
itself.

A Baltimore colleague launched a nation-wide cam

paign to enlist the support of the scientific community to
get Dingell to back down.

In a "Dear Colleague" letter, MIT

scientist Phillip Sharp asked researchers to help "in coun
tering the continuing activities of Rep. John Dingell's
subcommittee in Congress.1,68 The letter urged scientists
to write to every member of the subcommittee, particularly

67John Cary, "Congress Wants a Tougher FDA— But It's Not
Sure How Tough," Business Week. (January 14, 1991), 33.
68Barbara J. Culliton, "Dingell v. Baltimore," Science
244. 28 April 1989, 414.
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minority Republicans, in the hope that fellow congressmen
could stop the subcommittee which had "repeatedly rejected
the judgment of qualified scientists" that no fraud was
involved and had embarked on "a vendetta against honest
scientists" that would "cost our society dearly."

Dingell's

response to criticism from the academic and scientific press
describing his subcommittee as "sciencepolice" was to
request the assignment of Walter Stewart, Baltimore's pro
tagonist at NIH, to his subcommittee and to’call in the
Secret Service to check the validity of Dr. Imanishi-Kari's
journal entries, an action Baltimore predicted would have a
"chilling effect" on the scientific process.69
The most volatile point during the investigation came
on May 4, 1989, when Baltimore appeared before the committee
in a grueling day of testimony which lasted until nearly 7
p.m.

A large audience of scientists witnessed the indignant

Nobel prize winner lecture the subcommitteeon the scientif
ic process, question Dingell's motives, and defend his co
authors from what he termed the relentless pursuit of an
interventionist Congress.

Newspapers and the scientific

press portrayed the event as a personal duel between two
protagonists, announced that Baltimore had emerged as the
victor, and concluded that Dingell had uncharacteristically
botched the hearing.
Even when he was clearly on the defensive, Dingell

69David Baltimore, "Self Regulation of Science," Technolo
gy Review 6, August, 1989, 20.
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refused to back down.

Although the investigation raised

questions of abuse of power by his subcommittee and Dingell
and his staff were subjected to extensive criticism, partic
ularly from the scientific press, he continued to express
reservations about the ability of the scientific community
to police itself and unqualified support for his staff.
Mediaap Insurance

Chairman Dingell's interest in the insurance industry
i

in general and in insurance matters affecting the elderly in
particular are widely known.

The hearing was clearly di

rected at calling attention to sales abuses of questionable
insurance policies to gullible senior citizens.

The goal

was to gain support for potential legislation which would
allow the federal government to set regulations to govern
this type of insurance coverage.
Since individual states, not the federal government,
supplied what little regulation existed in this area at the
time the hearing was held in 1989, the hearing cannot be
considered traditional oversight since no federal agency was
involved.

Dingell was clearly using this forum to promote

his own policy agenda.
An interesting point is that Dingell selected a member
of his full committee staff to conduct the investigation
rather than assigning (or suggesting) it to a member of the
subcommittee investigative staff.

This is another indica

tion that Dingell was concerned with affecting policy, not
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conducting the type of investigation his subcommittee is
usually associated with.

The staff member I interviewed

frankly admitted that his and Dingell*s intention was to
create a record of the problem in the hope that it prompted
legislators to take the necessary action.
Regulation of the Medigap insurance industry is a
politically astute move which would undoubtedly appeal to
the influential senior citizen bloc at no cost to the feder
al government (or the deficit). The hearing was calculated
to draw attention to the problem, increase support for
potential legislation, and dampen opposition expected to
come not from the Republicans in Congress or the White House
but from the insurance industry itself.70
Blood Supply Safety

By the time the staff member who initiated the investi
gation into the nation's blood supply approached Chairman
Dingell with the need to hold a hearing on the issue, he
already knew that the focus of the investigation would be on
the blood industry, not the FDA, and that much of the criti
cism for laxity in standards was going to be directed at the
American Red Cross.

Hesitant to proceed further without

discussing possible negative ramifications of attacking a
revered institution with powerful supporters, he wanted to

70Dingell lost in the short run but won in the end.
Legislation he co-sponsored with Wyden shortly after the
hearing was lobbied down by the insurance industry but later
passed as part of the budget reconciliation bill in 1990.
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be sure that Dingell was aware of the implications of the
investigations and supported it.

He described the first

time he discussed the investigation with the chairman:
Funny; he usually goes at about 110 miles per hour.
When I first told him about the blood investigation, I
warned him that we were going to investigate the Ameri
can Red Cross. He stared at me for about five seconds
and said, "Ok, do it the right way. Keep me informed.
Testimony revealed numerous problems with the American
Red Cross record-keeping system and its failure to notify
the FDA ,of potentially fatal collection and’distribution
errors.

In contrast to the openly adversarial climate of

the generic drug probe, however, the blood investigation was
handled with a great deal of discretion and tact, largely
because of the potential for widespread public panic if
abuses in the collection and processing of this vital com
modity became widely known and partly because the attitude
of the organization's top administration was cooperative
from the beginning.
Dingell was apparently satisfied that any problems
would be corrected by the Red Cross and saw no point in
applying additional pressure to attracting further attention
once the organization agreed to tighten their restrictions.
Ozone Laver Depletion

Hearings into the effect of the international Montreal
Protocol on the banning of substances which affect the ozone
layer merged two issues of great concern to Dingell: the
environment and American competitiveness in the world mar
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ket.

Like the investigations into the Medigap insurance

industry, he used a staff member from the full committee
rather than a member of the subcommittee investigative staff
to handle the proceedings.

This staffer was described by an

individual on a subcommittee memberfs staff as someone whose
views regarding the environment were identical to Dingell's.
The purpose of the hearing seems to be similar to that
of the Medigap hearing, except that the pressure in this
case was clearly directed at the administration and the EPA.
Dingell's concern was apparently that environmental concerns
were receiving more priority than the country's competitive
trade position.

He was particularly concerned with the

effect of the Protocol on small to mid-sized businesses and
insuring that they received as much assistance as possible
during the transition from banned substances to acceptable
substitutes.
Medical Devices Industry

This investigation is a classic example of the type of
high-profile issue which adds to Dingell's stature without
much involvement on his part before it reaches the hearing
stage.

The issue received a lot of attention not only

because of the number of patients who had received the heart
valves which were the focus of the investigation (approxi
mately 86,000) and the relatively high rate of failure, but
also because of the potential legal cost to Pfizer in damage
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suits.71 Lawyers, doctors, the medical equipment industry,
and heart patients followed the proceedings with interest.
The staff member assigned to the case called it a
"great consumer issue" which generated a great deal of
interest, especially once the report became public and after
the California court ruling on the case.

She said that at

one point, the CEO of Pfizer met with Dingell to try to get
him to "soft pedal" the issue but that Dingell arranged for
her to attend the meeting and didn't attempt to "back door"
her.

She said that Dingell listened to Pfizer's arguments

but didn't relax the pressure.
She indicated that Dingell did not play a very promi
nent role in the investigation and allowed Wyden to direct
most of the questioning during the hearing.

However, she

said that Dingell was "pleased...(he) thought it was a great
hearing (which) served the purpose."

Curiously, although

Wyden was appointed to the conference committee to reconcile
the House and Senate versions of the bill which resulted, he
was not listed as one of the bill's sponsors.72
Of the cases I studied, this one was the most blatantly

71As of April 1990, Pfizer had settled approximately 200
claims for damages, all of them out of court, for amounts
reportedly as high as $1 million. In January, 1990, a Califor
nia appellate court ruled that a 39-year old patient could be
compensated for "mental anguish" if she and her lawyers can
prove that the manufacturer fraudulently misled the public
about the valve's risks. This ruling opens the door for the
56,000 implant recipients currently wearing the valve to sue
even if their devices function normally.
72The bill was sponsored by Dingell
Sikorski did not attend the hearing.

and Sikorski.
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partisan, with Republican members expressing sympathy for
manufacturers of medical equipment for use in high-risk
patients but also attacking the manner in which the compan
ion report, "The Bjork-Shiley Heart Valve: Earn As You
Learn," was prepared and submitted.

Additional details are

provided in Chapter VI.
Army Helicopter Procurement

Dingell has a long-standing interest in exposing dei

fense industry abuses which has earned him a reputation as a
turf-stealer and provoked hostility from his peers in Con
gress, particularly Les Aspin of the House Armed Services
Committee.

Although the quasi-official justification for

usurping the oversight of defense contractors is that they
are regulated by the SEC which Energy and Cdmmerce does have
jurisdiction over, the actual reason for the subcommittee's
activities appears to be that it regards Armed Services as
tied too closely to defense manufacturers and unwilling to
exert any controls over them.

The mantle thus falls (so the

logic goes) by default to the only subcommittee in Congress
willing to tackle the powerful on behalf of the public.
The focus of these particular defense hearings was
divided about equally between charges that the Army had
grossly underestimated what it took to maintain sophisticat
ed military equipment it had purchased and criticism of the
manufacturer for failing to correct defective designs or
supply appropriate parts.

Dingell took an obvious interest

80

in the progress of the investigations and was, the staff
members involved in them indicate, supportive as always.
After the close of the hearings, Dingell publicly
criticized the Army's plans to buy another $1.5 billion
worth of helicopters remaining on the contract and circulat
ed a copy of a letter he had addressed to Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney advising against the purchase.
Unfair Trade Practices

Dingell's reputation as a protectionist is, in large
measure, based on the needs of his Detroit constituents.
Opposed to deregulation, he believes the government should
protect the public against the abuses of the free market.
He seems to instinctively distrust corporations and has
focused much of his anger on Wall Street and- the defense
industries.

He is alarmed about the size of the US trade

deficit and a vocal critic of President Reagan's "coddling
of the Japanese" yet he bristles at the charges that he
supports a return to Smoot-Hawley protectionism.

Instead,

he advocates reciprocal trade agreements:
I didn't make this jungle. We just live here. And we
can't practice some polite rules that none of the other
predatory animals in this jungle are going to live by.
We have got to live by the rules that are here, and
there is no way that America is going to survive, or
American industry, or opportunities for our kids are
going to survive, if this is the only free trade coun
try in the world and everybody else practices restric
tive trade.73

^Thomas G. Donlan, "The Samurai Warrior from Michigan,"
Barron's . (April 15, 1985), 26.
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Despite disagreements with other committees and subcom
mittees over jurisdiction over trade issues, Dingell has
made it clear that he considers these matters his domain and
has used his subcommittee to hold hearings on trade issues
throughout the eighties.

The purpose of the hearings held

during this Congress was to examine recent landmark trade
legislation to see whether it was being enforced and having
the desired effect, as well as to influence the direction of
the GATT) negotiations expected to resume in'the future.
The hearings were structured to provide a forum for
numerous industries to call attention to problems they were
encountering in gaining access to global markets.

Their

testimony reinforced Dingell's argument that American compa
nies are at a competitive trade disadvantage and that mea
sures need to be adopted to counteract unfair tactics used
by other nations to protect their own industries.
Summary

Dingell's political interests clearly dominate the
subcommittee agenda.

Environmental, trade, health, and

consumer issues are high on his list of priorities and on
his oversight calendar.

Although staff members claim that

Dingell allows wide latitude in selection of topics for
investigation, they tend to gravitate towards areas in which
the chairman has an interest.

Occasional deviation from

this pattern, however, such as the scientific misconduct
investigation, reinforce Dingell's reputation as an aggres-
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sive opponent of waste and corruption and deflect criticism
of his subcommittee for focusing its attention exclusively
on issues of personal interest to the chairman.

Highly

publicized cases of this nature tend to originate with the
staff; the amount of attention devoted to these issues may
be tolerated because they are viewed as part of an overall
strategy to enhance the reputation of the subcommittee and
not necessarily for their value in correcting problems in
administrative agencies.

CHAPTER V
SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER PARTICIPATION74

Staff members interviewed indicated that in most in
stances, subcommittee members had very little involvement in
probes during the investigatory stage.

They indicated that

although congressmen and their personal staff were generally
i

informed about the progress of investigations, in most
instances they were seldom aware of specific details until
they were briefed shortly before hearings.

In general,

staff members tended to regard subcommittee members as the
audience for hearings, rather than active participants.
Some hearings appear to be deliberately orchestrated not
only to attract attention of the media and the public, but
the subcommittee members as well. One staff member described
the effect of hearings on members:
We don't get many surprises during the hearings. We
know what the witnesses are going to say and we already
have prepared the responses the members come back with.
Often the members are surprised, though, and sometimes
the best way to get a point across is to make them sit
there and listen to it firsthand. It's much more
effective than writing a report.
Another said that he considers the hearing as "an education
al tool" not only for the agency but for the members.

One

74See Appendix D for a complete list of members of the
subcommittee during the 101st Congress.
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staff member called the hearings "theatrical productions"
and said that witnesses may be called for their potential
"emotional impact". For example, during the medical device
hearing,
We brought in one witness I knew would cry during the
hearing. His wife had died from a faulty heart valve
and he cried during the preliminary interview. This
was really risky. Dingell hates tears and Mike (the
staff director) thought I shouldn't do it. I thought
it was too good to pass up so I did it anyway. About
halfway through his testimony, the witness started to
cry and I looked at Mike and he was looking at Dingell
and looked worried. A little later, he looked at me
and smiled so I knew it was OK.
Although staff members carefully avoid directly criti
cizing subcommittee members, it is clear that they consider
them tools to be manipulated during the oversight process
rather than full partners.

Because members seldom take any

initiative in requesting investigation into ‘particular
topics, staff members apparently assume that their commit
ment to oversight is merely superficial or political in
nature.

Their allegiance is clearly to Dingell, viewed as a

distinctive breed not only because he is chairman but be
cause they presumably share a similar philosophy with regard
to the importance of oversight in the political process.
It is difficult to determine whether Dingell takes member
preferences into consideration when setting his own over
sight agenda, although it is reasonable to assume that
members who have particular interests may channel them
through the chairman rather than approach subcommittee
staffers directly.
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Variance in Participation-Individual and Party Affiliation

Overall, participation in subcommittee hearing was much
higher among Republicans than Democrats.

As shown in Table

3, in fifteen hearings, Republican attendance (as a percent
TABLE 3
ATTENDANCE AT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS (BY PARTY AFFILIATION)

Hearing

# of
D

# of
R

% of subcommittee members
in attendance (by party)
Democrats
Republicans

Generic drugs

5/10/89
5/11/8,9
7/11/89
7/27/89
9/11/89
11/17/89
6/20/90
10/15/90
12/19/90
12/20/90

3
3
6
3
3
5
4
1
2
1

37.5J
37.52
75.02
37.52
37.52
50.02
12.52

40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
60.0%
40.0%
80.0%
80. 0%
40.0%

25.02
12.52

2 0 .0 %
0 .0 %

5
2
2
2

62.5%
25.0%
25.0%
25. 0%

60. 0%
60.0%

4

50.02

40.02

1

12.52

2 0 .0 %

3

37.52

80.0%

3
3

37.52
37.52

40.0%
60.0%

4

50.02

60.02

62.52

87.52

80.0%
80.0%

25.02
25.02

0 .0 %
2 0 .0 %

62.52

Scientific Fraud

5/04/89
5/09/90
4/30/90
5/14/90

0 .0%
0 .0 %

Medigap Insurance

4/26/89
Ozone Layer

5/15/89
Medical Devices

2/26/90
Army Helicopters

4/19/90
5/10/90
Blood Supply Safety

7/13/90

Unfair Trade Practices

3/01/89
3/02/89
7/30/90
9/24/90

5
7
2
2
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of total party membership on the subcommittee) was greater
than that of the majority party.75 All five minority mem
bers were very interested in the generic drug hearings and
attended regularly.
In most other cases, attendance varied depending on the
issue, except for Bliley and McMillan who seemed involved in
just about all of them.
Attendance at the subcommittee hearings for each of the
eight cases under examination are shown in tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 indicates the number of hearings on each issue con
ducted during the 101st Congress and the total number of
hearing hours devoted to each issue.

Table 5 measures the

percentage of attendance for each member at the hearings on
each of the eight issues.

As can be seen, there is a wide

divergence in hearing attendance among members of the sub
committee, and a noticeable difference between participation
by Democrats and Republicans.
Rep. Bliley, the ranking Republican on the subcommit
tee, seldom misses a hearing.

He attended at least one on

every single issue I studied; his attendance rate was 81.6%,
second only to Dingell's.

Although subcommittee staffers

generally describe him as cooperative, it is unclear whether
he attends hearings because he is interested (and support
ive) or whether he considers it his responsibility to over

75Democratic participation, as a percentage of total
subcommittee membership by party affiliation, was greater in
nine of the hearings.
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see the overseers.

Minority staff members insisted, of

course, that his participation stemmed from a genuine com
mitment to oversight and the work of the subcommittee.
The lack of Democratic attendance as a general rule is
somewhat puzzling.

Despite the considerable publicity

associated with most subcommittee hearings and the signifi
cant political benefits which would presumably accrue from
visible participation, interest appeared to be aligned with
constituent concerns.

This could be expected in relation

to routine committee hearings but was somewhat surprising on
an oversight subcommittee with excellent opportunities for
favorable media attention and the potential to earn (or
enhance) a reputation as a congressional watchdog.
The issues which sparked the most interest among sub
committee Democrats were generic drugs (and three Democrats
never attended ANY hearings on that issue) and unfair trade
practices, which provided a convenient forum for congressmen
to gripe at Trade Representative Hills and Commerce Secre
tary Mossbacher about how our trade policies were hurting
industries in their home states.
Subcommittee staffers singled out a few individuals for
their interest in the issues I studied.

Almost all of them

mentioned Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR), a former leader of the Gray
Panthers, who appears to share Dingell's interest in most
issues, except environmental protection.

He appeared to be

actively involved in at least four of the issues (medical
devices, blood supply safety, Medigap insurance, and generic
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drugs), which reflects his concern about issues which affect
the elderly.

Wyden's attendance record (76.8%) for hearings

is higher than other Democrats, except for Dingell overall
and Walgren (for the first session); he attended at least
one hearing on each of the issues, with the exception of the
one on the ozone layer.

Whenever Dingell is forced to leave

the hearing room for any reason, Wyden substitutes for him
as chairman.

He is a frequent spokesman in the press,

particularly on health-related issues.
Participation among other Democrats on the issues I
studied, however, ranged from Walgren's 78.8% to no partici
pation at all (Cooper).

Walgren's activity level was proba

bly affected by his acute interest in trade issues, specifi
cally those affecting the steel industry in his home dis
trict, and the fact that his district in Pittsburgh is the
home of Mylan Laboratories, the whistleblower whose initial
complaint triggered the generic drug investigation.

The

issue received a lot of publicity in Pennsylvania and it
would have been politically foolish for Walgren not to
maximize his role in the probe for the hometown press.

His

participation was probably also influenced by his chairman
ship of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection
and Competitiveness, which would have a logical interest in
many of the issues which came to the hearing stage during
his tenure on the subcommittee.
Eckhart (who has been called a "Dingell in training" by
the press) also seems to be substantially more interested in
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oversight issues than most of his Democratic colleagues,
even actively participating in the hearing on medical devic
es when he was no longer a member of the subcommittee during
the session in which the hearing was held.

Other Democrats,

however, did not express much interest in these particular
issues.

Of the three Democrats who were members of the

subcommittee for the entire two years, Sikorski had the best
attendance record, attending hearings on four of the eight
issues. , Collins managed to appear only during the hearing
on blood safety, and Bryant attended only two hearings on
unfair trade practices.

Boucher attended hearings on only

two of the five issues active during his service on the
subcommittee, while Schuer attended only the trade hearings
and Cooper none at all during the session he was a member.
Variance in Attendance by Issue
Examination of the data on attendance during hearings
reveals a wide variation in interest displayed by the mem
bers by issue, particularly among committee Democrats.

The

generic drug hearings, because they involved a highly-publi
cized scandal on a subject of great interest to many con
stituent groups, generated substantial member interest.
One staffer on the scientific fraud investigation
contended that subcommittee members provided very little
support during the controversy; instead, he said they
"strayed like roaches in the sunlight."

He recalled that

few of them bothered to show up for the first hearing (in

1988) and even those who did were not overly enthusiastic.
This lukewarm reception may have stemmed from a sense that
there was little political advantage to be gained from an
attack on the integrity of the scientific community, but
conversations from congressional staff indicate that there
was a strong feeling that the subcommittee staff had overex
tended itself on this particular battle.

Regardless of

their feelings about the investigation, however, a respect
able number of members did attend the hearings held during
this congress.

The three Republicans who attended the

hearings, in particular, were certainly not disinterested,
spending nearly 14 hours each listening to testimony from
Drs. O'Toole, Imanishi-Kari and Baltimore.
However, most Democrats appeared apathetic about the
medical device and army procurement hearings, and neither
party (with the exception of Dingell and Bliley) showed any
interest whatsoever in the environmental issue.
The staff member who handled the trade investigation
indicated that those hearings deliberately focused on
"things that tied to a member's district" to give everyone
on the subcommittee a personal (and political) stake in the
proceedings.
the

Witnesses in the private sector representing

telecommunications, pharmaceutical, steel, motion

picture and auto parts industries testified that the Act had
failed to open new international markets to American prod
ucts and that intellectual property rights violations had
weakened the U.S. competitive position.

Sikorski (Minneso-
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ta), Oxley (Ohio), Bryant (Texas), and McMillan (North
Carolina) were concerned about trade policies which affected
the semiconductor and supercomputer industries in their home
districts.

Bliley (Virginia) criticized Thailand and the

People*s Republic of China for banning the importation of
American tobacco products.

Walgren (Pennsylvania) and

Eckart (Ohio) wanted extensions of the Voluntary Restraint
Agreements to help protect the steel industry in their
districts; Eckart also wanted a change in policies to bene
fit the auto parts industry which is rapidly becoming a
significant part of Ohio's manufacturing base.

Even Wyden,

who usually calls himself "the last of the free traders,"
expressed dissatisfaction with the recent free trade agree
ment with Canada which he said had negative repercussions on
Oregon's wine and timber industries.

McMillan's primary

concern was the American position on trade policies affect
ing the textile industry, in particular the multi-fiber
agreements which are on the agenda for discussion during the
GATT negotiations.
On the other hand, Rep. Lent of New York was concerned
that sanctions against Japan for protectionist policies
would backfire against the aerospace contractors in his
district whose finished products incorporated semiconductors
and other parts manufactured overseas.
The significant level of interest in the trade issue
lends credence to the argument that Congressmen, even Con
gressmen on this renowned oversight subcommittee, prefer to
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spend their efforts on activities which will pay off in
terms of constituent support.

The trade hearings were not

so much an effort to determine whether administrative agen
cies were carrying out the terms of recent trade legislation
as an opportunity to affect national trade policy and push
for increased protectionism for U.S. companies.
Summary

In summary, where political incentives for participaI

tion in oversight hearings were present, participation among
subcommittee members increased.

If no significant political

link could be determined, this was reflected in a drop in
attendance at hearings.

However, there appeared to be no

clear pattern of participation which resulted from a desire
to perform oversight of the bureaucracy in a traditional
sense.

Instead, subcommittee member interest seemed to

result more from constituent concerns.
Surprisingly, participation across the spectrum of the
issues under investigation was consistently higher among
Republican members of the subcommittee, whose overall rate
of participation was markedly greater at 56% than was that
of the Democrats (30%).

CHAPTER VI
PARTISANSHIP AND MINORITY INVOLVEMENT

In response to questions about participation by minori
ty subcommittee members, most staff members insist that
oversight investigations are largely bipartisan and do not
become the focus of political rivalries.

One staff member

described the political atmosphere on the subcommittee as:
...very nonpartisan. All politicians run against
fraud, waste and abuse. Most members don't want to get
in the way of this train. We work well with the Repub
licans on most issues.
Barrett said that Dingell was more concerned with
competition between branches than with party rivalry.
Being a creature of the House, Dingell regards ANY
administration as the enemy. He believes completely in
the idea of checks and balances. He certainly showed
no hesitation in attacking the last Democratic presi
dent (Carter) when he felt he deserved it.
Dingell has often insisted that oversight should be
above partisan politics:
We have gone after Democratic administrations and
Republican...we have gone after Democratic appointees
and Republican. We have made misery for Democraticcontrolled agencies in government and regulatory agen
cies appointed by Democratic administrations, and we
have done the same thing to Republicans. We are quite
indifferent about that. The law is the law, and we are
here to see that it will be carried out.76

76Donlan, 28.
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On a practical basis, the current staff director speculated
that the absence of partisan tension is strategically advan
tageous.
If our investigations were reduced to partisan issues,
we would be constantly trading political shots. That
would slow us down and render us ineffective. The
investigations are strictly fact-driven, not political.
These observations were verified in interviews with
minority staff members, one of whom commented that:
Investigations certainly don't appear to be partisan in
geperal. We all work together; there are really few, if
any partisan issues that I am aware of. I think there
was a time when it was more partisan but that was
before I got here. I work well with majority staff;
the only problems I have are due to communications
breakdowns and that isn't really their fault. You are
involved from the beginning. It varies from person to
person, but once you are trusted, they bring you on
board real quick.
Nevertheless, despite frequent assurances from Dingell,
subcommittee members and staff that oversight investigations
are not motivated by partisanship or designed to embarrass a
Republican president, at least one minority staff member has
expressed some reservations on this point:
...with a Republican administration to shoot at
(Dingell) hasn't been as willing to see things from an
executive point of view. If there were a Democratic
president or if he were a Republican, there would be a
tendency to step back and do less administration bash
ing.
However, this same staff member conceded that, given
Dingell's devotion to exposing misconduct and problems in
the agencies,
...if there were a Democratic administration, (the
subcommittee) would be just as busy and the battles
might be even more bitter...the rivalry between Dingell
and Waxman would probably be even more pronounced.

Another minority staff member supported this position,
commenting that he saw the rivalries on the committee less
as partisan disputes than as contests between subcommittees
and dominant personalities among the Democrats.

However,

should the Democrats regain the White House and still manage
to maintain control of both houses of Congress, it is rea
sonable to assume that a resurgence in party discipline
would occur which would discourage this type of behavior
among congressional Democrats.

In any event, Dingell's

subcommittee would not be immune to partisan pressure from
the executive branch and House leaders.

It is therefore

dangerous to assume that partisan politics plays only a
minor role in this subcommittee's investigations despite
sanctimonious assurances to the contrary.
However, in line with the current official benevolent
attitude adopted with regard to repressed partisan tension
during investigations, subcommittee staffers tended to
describe Republican members in complementary terms, as
"sage", "well intentioned", "sincere" and "supportive".
They appeared to be especially fond of Rep. Thomas Bliley
*51
(R-VA), the ranking Republican on the subcommittee for his
cooperation and willingness to put partisan politics aside
in the interest of conducting "honest" oversight.
A legislative aide to a subcommittee member presented a
collaborating, if somewhat more politically realistic,
explanation.

She commented that Republicans like the pub

licity that normally results from the hearings and tend to
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downplay partisan differences during the investigatory
stage.

There are political incentives to be gained from

appearing to watchdog federal agencies or attacking indus
tries which misuse government funds, particularly if criti
cism is not directed toward their party and administration.
It is a different story, the aide commented, if the hearings
result in the introduction of legislation opposed by the
President or party leaders.
They're with you until legislation is proposed and the
administration doesn't support it. All of a sudden,
they're out of the picture.
The political angle was also mentioned by subcommittee
staff members who seem aware that they can count on minority
cooperation during investigations, but are apparently less
confident that this will translate into support for a legis
lative solution.

It may be a significant factor in the

cynical attitude most of them hold toward corrective legis
lative.

In general, staff members tend to dismiss legisla

tive solutions to correct embedded problems within the
government because bills get "bogged down in politics",
preferring instead to
...expose what's going on. We create pressure. Someone
is awakened to do the right thing, or maybe pressured
to do the right thing.
In contrast to the subcommittee's efforts under Chair
man Moss which attempted to influence pending legislation or
the introduction of new measures, most staff members were
more concerned with applying pressure on administrative
agencies to implement existing regulations.

Staff comments
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with regard to additional legislation were blunt and pessi
mistic:
There is already more than enough legislation out
there. Our job is to keep the pressure on to implement
it as toughly as they should.
Legislation can't fix anything. Politics comes out.
If we can manage to get something through the House, it
gets stuck in the Senate.
What we do here is not legislation driven. Possibili
ties of legislative change are encompassed, of course,
but we don't focus on it. You can spotlight where
changes are needed and hope that the agency makes them
or appropriate action results from exposure.
However, it was less clear that this bias is shared by the
subcommittee chairman.
One major problem for minority members is that they
have no real control over the agenda.

Although there appear

to be no barriers preventing Republicans from requesting an
investigation, this does not seem to be a common occurrence.
Subcommittee staffers indicate a willingness to conduct
investigations upon request from members of either party,
but emphasize that most investigations result from staff
initiative.

A minority staff member could recall only one

issue which was minority-driven (Telestar).

Republican

members can also utilize the General Accounting Office and
can request an investigation on any subject which interest
them.

There was no problem with access to the GAO a few

years ago when a minority member requested a independent
study on railroad retirement plans; he quickly obtained GAO
assistance in compiling the information he needed.

As

Dingell appears to take a conciliatory position with regard
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to his minority members and often proposes legislation with
both Democratic and Republican sponsors, there does not
appear to be much incentive for partisan competition.
In spite of Dingell's continued insistence that there
is no "majority staff, only subcommittee staff", the minori
ty staff suffer obvious disadvantages in comparison with the
staff which reports to Dingell and his fellow Democrats.
First, there are only 22 of them, and they must serve the
entire full committee.

In contrast, there are currently 14 0

"majority" staff on the full committee, most of them as
signed to specific subcommittees.

There are, therefore,

almost as many full-time investigators assigned to this one
subcommittee as there are minority staff who work for the
entire full committee.
In addition, it is far easier for "majority" staff
members to focus on narrow interests and develop a level of
expertise which minority staff, far outnumbered and shuffled
between subcommittees, are seldom able to obtain.

Further,

the chain of command for subcommittee (majority) staff is
very clear: first Dingell, then the other Democratic subcom
mittee members.

If involved with an oversight and investi

gations subcommittee probe, a minority staff member must
answer equally to all four minority members on the subcom
mittee and secondly to all Republicans on the full committee
who might have questions or concerns.
Most subcommittee staffers appeared to make a consci
entious effort to include minority staff in all aspects of
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the investigation.

Staff members claimed that minority

staff was "100% involved", or "involved from the beginning
stages" and the investigations were "absolutely nonparti
san" .
None of the minority staff members I interviewed com
plained of unfair treatment by the subcommittee members or
staff, but all of them mentioned structural difficulties and
time constraints which hindered their effectiveness.

Most

complaints from minority staff members center on scheduling
conflicts and the inability to focus on only one issue at a
time, neither of which they blame on the subcommittee staff.
Involved with several investigations simultaneously, they
often face painful choices when hearings or interviews for
different cases are scheduled simultaneously.

The minority

staff do not appear to blame subcommittee staff for these
difficulties, as one aide commented:
It's not their fault. We're stretched pretty thin.
Oversight and Investigations is a very active subcom
mittee and the staff is aggressively involved in a
number of issues all the time. They try their best to
keep us informed on everything, but we can't always
keep up.
In most investigations, minority staff say that they
are treated as "equal partners" in the investigations,
although some hearings involve separate minority efforts.
Minority staffers say they are usually given more than the
required seven days notice about a scheduled hearing and
receive adequate time to review materials.

Long-time minor

ity staffers commented that their relations with the "major-
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ity" staff had vastly improved under Barrett's tenure, and
they expected this to continue under the new staff director,
Reid Stuntz.

Both men, they indicated, made a conscientious

effort to keep them informed.
However, in three of the investigations (Medigap insur
ance, scientific misconduct, and medical devices) there
appeared to be indications of partisan tension.

Therefore,

the assertion that partisan politics plays a minimal role in
subcommittee investigations could be challenged in half of
the cases I examined.
Generic Drug Approval Process

Republican support for the probe was strong from its
inception, particularly from Bliley, who later co-sponsored
(with Dingell) legislation designed to prevent similar
problems from occurring again in the future.

Republican

support for the investigation remained solid throughout the
ordeal in spite of strong lobbying efforts by the pharmaceu
tical industry.

It is particularly striking that Rep. Lent,

who represents a state (New York) which is the home of many
of the generic drug firms under investigation, continued to
wholeheartedly agree with efforts to correct abuses in the
industry, despite layoffs of hundreds of innocent employees
as the investigation proceeded.
During the stormiest moments of the investigation, when
Bolar Pharmaceutical Company took out full-page newspaper
ads blasting Dingell and his staff for "creating a climate
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of fear in the generic drug industry,"77 it was the minori
ty members who reacted with the greatest outrage.
There was some concern expressed within Congress (but
not the subcommittee) that the generic drug industry was
being unfairly singled out for publicity because problems
uncovered with generic drug approvals existed throughout the
FDA.

Some members complained that Dingell's investigation

and his proposed solutions were "overly heavy-handed and
could work against restoring confidence in generic
drugs."78 The fact that criticism of this type did not
apparently surface among Republican members of the subcom
mittee may be connected to a remedy proposed by Bliley (and
supported by President Bush) allowing the FDA to charge drug
companies user fees to review and process applications.

In

the past, this idea had been backed by the administration
and Republican legislators but defeated by Democrats.
Minority support for the investigation may have, therefore,
may have masked a hidden agenda, which definitely had parti
san overtones.
Scientific Misconduct
During the widely-publicized and emotional hearings on
the Baltimore cell paper, one Republican member was very
critical of the investigation and fought it until the draft

77Rogers, 1.
78Julie Kosterlitz, "Drug Therapy," National Journal. May
25, 1991, 1233.
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of the NIH report was released.

According to a minority

staff member, although some majority members were fairly
convinced that the subcommittee staff had done an adequate
job, most minority members were more skeptical and none of
them showed up for the initial hearing in April of 1988.
By 1989, however, the majority of Republicans on the subcom
mittee were actively involved in the investigation.
The "Dear Colleague" letter campaign instigated by an
MIT scientist may have produced the desired'results with
minority subcommittee members.

In his opening statement at

the May 4th hearing, Rep. Norman Lent urged his colleagues
to approach the day's testimony with caution.

Rep. Alex

McMillan wondered aloud whether "anyone had ever examined
the notebooks of Albert Einstein."
Subcommittee staffers attribute the lack of support
among Republicans members to the controversial nature of the
investigations.

With the hearings receiving vehement criti

cism from the scientific community and the press, there was
no political incentive to be associated with what was gener
ally perceived to be a misguided attempt to regulate the
scientific profession.

Several Democratic members of the

subcommittee also distanced themselves from the inquiry but
were more hesitant in voicing their objections.
Medigap Insurance

During the Medigap insurance investigations, minority
members were portrayed by staff as being generally more
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sympathetic to the insurance industry, but not generally in
a position to obstruct the investigation.

In contrast to

the abuses which were being charged by the majority, in his
opening statement, Bliley remarked that problems with
Medigap policies had decreased during the eighties and
expressed his reservations that no representation from the
insurance industry had been invited to testify before the
subcommittee.

McMillan also indicated that he felt the

insurance companies were, in general, behaving responsibly
in trying to protect consumers from unscrupulous agents and
that the blame should be placed on state regulators not the
insurance industry.
Medical Devices

The most partisan issue I investigated -was clearly the
medical devices hearing.

There appear to have been two

dimensions to the tensions which surfaced during the course
of the hearing.

First, the Republicans expressed sympathy

for the manufacturers of "high risk" medical equipment, and
secondly, there was an uncharacteristic lack of cooperation
between subcommittee and minority staff. In his opening
statement, normally cooperative Congressman Bliley expressed
reservations about the hearing and its accompanying report:
In this case, we seem to be approaching a fine line
that separates FDA oversight of medical devices from
practicing medicine. I am not a doctor, I have not
been trained in medicine, and I am patently unqualified
form rendering medical opinions. I believe the same
applies to the individuals who prepared the report
being issued today. Yet this report appears to analyze
and interpret medical phenomena, question the findings
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of scientific experts, and make medical judgements that
the subcommittee and its staff have just no business
making.
He also complained that minority staff members had not
participated in the preparation of the report and were given
insufficient time to review the report before or after its
publication.

He also complained that he did not receive

adequate notice about the appearance of several witnesses
who testified during the hearing.
Rep. Lent also charged that the minority staff member
had been deliberately denied access to materials regarding
the case and voiced his concern that there were now only
about three companies making prosthetic heart valves and "if
we keep beating up on these people...we are going to have
even less than three people in this business."

In addition,

he attacked the credibility and motivation of one of the
witnesses (a lawyer representing the plaintiffs in a class
action suit against Pfizer).
Oxley compared the situation to the "pseudo-scare about
the use of alar on apples" and blamed unscrupulous lawyers
for creating a climate of panic in heart valve recipients by
advertising for claimants against the manufacturer.
McMillan, the fourth Republican to attend the hearing ex
pressed regret that the report issued by the staff was not
shared with the minority staff prior to the hearing and
attempted to establish during questioning of witnesses that
all heart implants involved substantial risk to patients.

According to the staff member working on this case,
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Pfizer lobbyists "got to the minority.

She indicated that

minority members tried to kill the hearing, but were "blis
tered" by Dingell and apparently apologized later for inter
fering with the investigation.

She also readily admitted

that the minority staff member had been intentionally
slighted during the preparation for the hearing and its
companion report but justified her decision because "...he
was a jerk; he is a politico...didn't spend time on the
issue." ' The animosity which was directed toward the minori
ty staff member appeared to be of a personal nature and
might have been unconnected to the larger issue of Republi
can sympathy for a company under siege.
Summary
Although there did not appear to be significant parti
san tension between Democrats and Republicans on four of the
issues (trade, ozone layer, army helicopter procurement, and
blood supply safety), there was clearly some division on
three of them and in the generic drug investigation, Repub
lican cooperation may have resulted, at least in part, from
a hidden agenda.

Therefore, in spite of subcommittee

staff's depiction of unbiased, nonpartisan cooperation,
closer inspection of several issues reveals an underlying
dimension of distinctly different attitudes between Republi
can and Democratic subcommittee members in at least 37% (and
possibly 50%) of the cases.

CHAPTER VII
OUTCOME OP THE INVESTIGATIONS
Generic Drucr Approval Process

The investigations into the generic drug approval
process resulted in criminal convictions (to date) of five
FDA officials, four generic drug manufacturers, nine indus
try executives and an industry consultant, and federal
officials indicate there are more to come.

By the close of

the hearings, the FDA commissioner (Frank E. Young) had
resigned and more than 100 generic drug products, including
the largest-selling generic, a version of the blood pressure
medication Dyazide, had been pulled from the market.

Of

approximately 36 generic drug companies with more than one
product on the market, about 18 are currently under criminal
investigation by the Justice Department.79
In 1990, Dingell and Bliley introduced the Emergency
Food and Drug Enforcement Act which would have increased the
resources of the FDA, provided enforcement penalties, and
given the agency swift recall authority.

The bill was

dropped at the last minute after the Senate, which favored
more comprehensive legislation covering food, brand name

79Kosterlitz, 1233.
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products, and medical devices as well as generic drugs,
declined to support it.
On September 25, 1991, the full committee passed
HR2454, sponsored by Dingell and co-sponsored by every
member of the committee, which gives the FDA considerably
more authority to invoke sanctions, including debarment from
the drug approval process and authority to suspend distribu
tion of generic drugs of any company which has abused the
approval process.

The act also provides civil penalties as

well as a "whistleblower award."

It is expected to be

signed into law without opposition during the current con
gressional session.
Scientific Misconduct
In the wake of the publicity surrounding the Cell
paper, the NIH established an Office of Scientific Integri
ty80 to investigate allegations of misconduct involving
federal research funds.

A draft report issued by this

office indicated that Dr. Imanishi-Kari "probably" fabricat
ed data in the paper she wrote with Dr. Baltimore.81
In March, 1991, Dr. Baltimore asked that the Cell paper
be retracted because of evidence that it had included falsi-

80In July 1991, the subcommittee accused NIH director
Bernadine Healy of obstructing the investigation into the
Baltimore case and another probe by removing a deputy director
who was supervising both.
81David L. Wheeler, "NIH Director Accused of Improper
Interference in Agency's Investigations of Scientific Fraud,",
The Chronicle of Higher Education. August 7, 1991, A7.
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fied data.

Fraud and perjury charges are now being consid

ered with respect to Dr. Imanishi-Kari.
Medigap Insurance

Following the hearing, Congress tightened federal
regulation of Medigap insurance as part of the huge budget
reconciliation bill (PL-101-508, Omnibus Budget Reconcilia
tion Act of 1990) which cleared Congress on November 5,
1990.

Part 5 of the Medicare provisions in Subtitle A

provided for standardization of Medigap policies, required
that companies return at least 65 cents of every premium
dollar in benefits, barred the sales of policies that dupli
cate Medicare, prohibited the direct sale of Medigap poli
cies to recipients of Medicaid, mandated that every policy
sold be approved by insurance regulators at *the state or
federal level, and forced insurance companies to sell
Medigap policies to all senior citizens who seek them within
six months of becoming eligible for Medicare.82
Blood Supply Safety

Following the hearing, the Red Cross committed $120
million to completely modernize 53 regional blood collection
centers.

Computer systems are now being installed to track

donors and the blood stock, and laboratory personnel are
being trained to test properly for infectious diseases.

By

the time these innovations are completed, the United States

82Rovner, 3720.
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will have the most effective blood collection system in the
world.

In this case, no legislation was required to force

the FDA to direct the Red Cross to change its procedures.
The actions taken by theRed Crosswerestrictly
response to problems whichsurfaced during

a voluntary

theinvestigation

and hearing process.
Ozone Laver Depletion

The hearing forced the EPA and the administration to
confront the problems resulting from strict compliance with
the terms of the Protocol, especially as some of the key
substitutes recommended by the EPA have proven to be toxic.
Other substitutes that EPA officials had assumed to be safe,
such as turpine, appear to be highly inflammatory and are
being resisted by insurance companies concerned about the
increased potential of industrial fires.
One of the accomplishments of the 101st Congress was
major revision of the Clean Air Act after 13 years of hear
ings and debates.

Concerns raised in the subcommittee

hearings were incorporated into Title VI of the revised
bill, (PL-101-549, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990), espe
cially those issues relating to CRFC substitutes and timeta
bles for their adoption.

Federal assistance has been prom

ised to help bring industries into compliance with pollution
standards and to assist in identifying and testing substi
tutes for banned substances.

Deadline extensions will be

granted if acceptable substitutes cannot be found within the
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time limits outlined in the Protocol and the amendments.
Medical Devices

Following the hearing, the FDA initiated a series of
unprecedented steps to correct the problems which the sub
committee and other groups addressed.

These included remov

ing the heart valve's Pre Market Approval, initiating a
patient and physician notification process, and determining
steps for a criminal investigation against Shiley, Inc.

The

i

subcommittee presented the FDA with information that the
company had withheld information regarding both the alleged
therapeutic benefits of the valve and the incidence of strut
failure.

In August, 199 0, Shiley announced that it had

awarded a grant to Medic Alert to implement a worldwide
patient notification program.
The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 (PL-101-629)
approved on November 21, 1990, gave the FDA a comprehensive
framework to regulate medical devices to ensure their safety
and effectiveness. It required companies to report problems
with medical devices to the FDA promptly, gave the FDA
subpoena authority to request documentation when necessary
and order the recall of devices whenever there is reasonable
probability that the device will cause adverse health conse
quences or death.
Army Helicopter Procurement
Following the hearings, Dingell publicly criticized

plans to purchase the additional 132 Apache helicopters
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remaining on the contract at a cost of $14 million each.
It is difficult to quantify the impact of the Apache inves
tigation since it didn't succeed in blocking the sale.
Staff members, however, argue that the investigations sent a
"loud and clear" message to the Army about its procurement
habits, and that after adverse publicity about the perfor
mance of the equipment, the Army is finally taking action to
correct some of the problems with spare parts and adequate
support Ipersonnel.

Further, the negative publicity which

surrounded the manufacturer, McDonnell-Douglas, for its
design failures and inability to correct problems with the
equipment was probably a significant factor in its loss to
the Boeing/Sikorsky team for the contract for the new Coman
che helicopter now in the development stages.
Unfair Trade Practices

It is difficult to measure the outcome of continuous
efforts like trade hearings.

A staff member described a

"successful" hearing as simply a part of a process, inten
tionally consistent with the actions of main trade negotia
tions, to provide leverage for key trade officials to use
with foreign governments and, when necessary, with a reluc
tant administration.

In light of Dingell's protectionist

position with regard to trade, hearings calling attention to
inequities in international trade arrangements or the fail
ure of foreign governments to live up to bi-lateral agree
ments can be assumed to be part of a long-term strategy to
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boost support for tighter restrictions on foreign trade
and/or import quotas and increased tariffs.

The hearings

also seem to be clearly designed to prod the administration
into taking a more aggressive posture during the upcoming
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Summary

In spite of staff consensus that legislative change is
not the goal of oversight hearings, four of the eight cases
I investigated resulted in significant legislation to cor
rect problems uncovered during the course of the probes.

A

summary of legislative and other actions appears in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
RESULTS OF OVERSIGHT INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES STUDIED
Case

Generic drug approvals

Scientific misconduct

Outcome

HR 2454, passed by Energy and
Commerce Committee? pending
floor action
Sponsors: all members of
committee
Agency reform (institution of
Office of Scientific Integri
ty, NIH), perjury charges
pending against Dr. ImanishiKari

Medigap insurance

PL-101-508 (Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990)
Approved: November 15, 1990

Blood supply safety

$120 million committed by
American Red Cross to modern
ize blood collection centers

Ozone layer depletion

PL-101-549 (Clean Air Amend
ments of 1990)
Approved: November 15, 1990

Medical devices

PL-101-629 (Safe Medical De
vices Act of 1990)
Approved: November 28, 1990

Helicopter procurement

Attempt to block purchase of
additional units unsuccessful
Agency reform (efforts to
provide adequate spare parts
and personnel)
Contractor failed in bid for
additional helicopter con
tract.

Unfair trade practices

Ongoing effort to influence
trade legislation.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis compares an image of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee obtained through staff inter
views with one which emerges from inspection of hearing
reports and newspaper and magazine articles- on eight of the
issues investigated during the 101st Congress.

Staff mem

bers describe their subcommittee as nonpartisan in nature,
with an agenda driven primarily by staff initiative, sup
ported (but not dominated) by an aggressive chairman, and
directed at enforcement of existing, rather than introduc
tion of new, legislation.

My findings indicate a subcommit

tee with some level of disagreement between Democrats and
Republicans on a significant number of cases, markedly
distinct levels of participation between Democratic and
Republican members, a subcommittee agenda reflecting the
political interests of its chairman at a substantial level,
and inclined to pursue legislative solutions to problems
unveiled during subcommittee hearings.
The discrepancy illustrates some of the methodological
difficulties encountered in trying to generate conclusions
based primarily on interviews with staff members.

These

problems were compounded because members of congressmen's
116
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personal staffs were reluctant to challenge the subcommittee
staff depictions of activities as nonpartisan.

Nor did

anyone I interviewed appear willing to criticize Chairman
Dingell's integrity or tactics.

Although it is possible

that respect for the Chairman is so ingrained as to be
unquestioned, it is more likely that his personal power and
forceful personality dictate a prudent response when trou
blesome questions are raised.
However, some interesting observations about the cases
which were reviewed for this thesis are in order.
!•

Investi-

gations initiated by staff members tended to become more
controversial than the issues which originated with Chairman
Dingell.

It is my impression that Dingell uses oversight

hearings as one of a variety of weapons to further his
legislative agenda, patiently building a public record of
problems in a particular area to support legislation which
he plans to introduce or sponsor at some point in the fu
ture. This approach seems to be utilized primarily in those
hearings which result from his own initiative.
On the other hand, staff members tend to be attracted
to issues which have the potential to generate maximum press
exposure and publicity to enhance the subcommittee's reputa
tion as congresional watchdogs.

The chairman's unwavering

support under fire is deeply appreciated by his staff and
reinforces both their loyalty to him and their respect for
his integrity.

His willingness to absorb criticism for

their actions may represent a subtle, but deliberate, strat
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egy aimed at maintaining harmony between the chairman and
the staff and minimizing any potential difference in philos
ophy. It is interesting to speculate whether Dingell consid
ers his staff's ventures into headline-grabbing scandals a
worthy price to pay for their ability to maintain steady
pressure on the administration and agencies in areas he
considers to be vital to the public interest.

He may toler

ate (or even encourage) issue-specific investigations to
escalate the climate of fear and intimidation generally
associated with his subcommittee in order to increase its
clout on the larger issues affecting policy which may be his
primary concern.
There is little doubt that the competence and skill of
the subcommittee staff provides the chairman with the tech
nical expertise to conduct extensive investigations into
complicated issues.

He apparently trusts their instincts

and experience, allowing them wide latitude in framing and
pursing investigations which they initiate.

In return,

Dingell's trust, lack of interference, and unwavering per
sonal support during critical periods have earned him the
gratitude of his staff who obviously admire him and respect
his loyalty and integrity.
Although this mutual admiration scenario appears to be
genuine, there is undoubtedly another, more realistic,
dimension to the relationship.

Dingell's reputation as an

aggressive opponent of fraud and waste has been enhanced,

large measure, by the efforts of an usually diligent and

in
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dedicated staff.

It is, therefore, in his interest to

retain them and to do whatever is necessary to reinforce
their zeal and commitment since their activities contribute
to his prestige and performance in the House.

This in

cludes allowing them free rein to pursue lines of inquiry
which interest them as well as consistent support if they
occasionally go too far.

In return, the most aggressive of

these staff members obviously enjoy the attention and power
which accompanies a position on the subcommittee and have
obtained an appreciable degree of personal recognition from
years of widely-publicized investigations.

Tactics and

behavior not only tolerated, but rewarded, on this subcom
mittee would probably not find the same reception in most
professional environments.

The staff is generally acknowl

edged to be very well compensated and it is unlikely that
they are particularly anxious to test the job market within
other federal agencies or in the Washington community.

It

is to their advantage then to increase Dingell's satisfac
tion with the performance of the subcommittee by continuing
those activities which bring favorable attention to their
chairman while avoiding those which might cause him unneces
sary political embarrassment or loss of prestige among his
peers.

The task then is to navigate a balance between the

type of issues which are investigated, enhancing the reputa
tion of the subcommittee while allowing the chairman to use
the prestige of the panel to pursue his own policy agenda.
Dingell's commitment to oversight is widely regarded
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and politically advantageous.

However, it is quite possible

that he uses his oversight resources as a tool to influence
policy in much the same manner as Moss did when he chaired
the subcommittee.

Subcommittee hearings are often a conve

nient forum for Dingell's own policy views rather than an
honest attempt to determine administrative compliance with
legislative intent.
Finally, Dingell's strategy in obtaining Republican
cooperation by allowing them to take credit’for oversight
successes and including them as sponsors on legislation may
result as much from political necessity as a desire to
minimize partisan conflict.

In spite of his description of

himself as a "New Deal Liberal", his views are closer to
those of moderate Republicans on his committee, especially
with regard to matters affecting industry, than they are to
many of the members of his own party.

Republican interest

in subcommittee investigations may reflect not only politi
cal benefits from publicity, as staff members suspect, but
an underlying sympathy with Dingell's policy agenda.

Ten

sion, when it does arise during the hearings, tends to occur
over issues selected by subcommittee staff, rather the
chairman.
The 1980s has seen the issues of the deficit, tax
reform, and reduced federal spending influence the liberal
agenda.

Congress can no longer afford to allow "pork

barrel" politics to dominate its activities, as it becomes
increasingly obvious that there will be less and less pork
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to distribute in the coining decades.

The major policy

issues facing Congress will be regulatory ones: financial
services, communications, health care, energy, technology,
transportation, and science.

Dingell's investigative sub

committee appears to be attempting to striking a balance
between traditional process questions (largely introduced by
staff members) focusing on wrongdoing and scandals and those
issues involving policy review, which seem to be initiated
by Chairman Dingell as part of his strategy' to influence
upcoming legislation.

122

APPENDIX A
INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. House Commit
tee on Energy and Commerce current and former staff members:
Reid P. F. Stuntz, Chief Counsel and Staff Director.
Personal interview, Washington, D.C., July 18, 1991.
Michael F. Barrett, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Direc
tor, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
(1981-91). Personal interview, Washington, D.C., July
24, 1991.
Claudia Beville, Special Assistant. Personal
interview, Washington, D.C., July 26, 1991.
Bruce F. Chafin, Special Assistant. Personal inter
view, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1991.
David W. Nelson, Economist. Personal interview, Wash
ington, D.C., July 31, 1991.
Stephen F. Sims, Special Assistant. Personal inter
view, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1991.
Peter D. H. Stockton, Research Analyst.* Telephone
interview, July 22, 1991.
Committee on Energy and Commerce staff members:
David B. Finnegan, Counsel.
October 10, 1991.

Telephone interview,

Donald E. Shriber, Counsel.
August 6, 1991.

Telephone interview,

Committee on Energy and Commerce minority staff members:
Thomas C. Montgomery, Minority Counsel. Personal
interview, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1991.
John Hambel, Minority Counsel and Press Secretary.
Telephone interview, September 19, 1991.
Dennis B. Wilson, Minority Counsel. Personal inter
view, Washington, D.C., July 30, 1991.
John Sheik, Minority Counsel.
September 20, 1991.

Telephone interview,
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General Accounting Office
James Shafer, Senior Investigator. (Currently on loan
to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for
one year). Personal interview, Washington, D.C., July
30, 1991.
Members of personal staff of subcommittee members:
Ellen Donesky, Legislative Assistant to Representative
Gerry Sikorsky (D-Mn). Telephone interview, October
10, 1991.
Wendy Horowitz, Legislative Assistant to Representative
Ron Wyden (D-OR). Telephone interview, October 10,
1991.
t

Sara Franko, Legislative Assistant to Representative
Dennis Eckart (D-OH). Telephone interview, October 17,
1991.

124

APPENDIX B
FORMAL J U R I S D I C T I O N OF THE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE

The formal jurisdiction of the House Energy and Com
merce Committee includes:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Interstate and foreign commerce, generally
National energy policy generally
Measures relating to the exploration, production,
storage, supply, marketing, pricing and regulation
of energy resources, including all fossils, fuels,
solar energy and other unconventional or renewable
energy resources
(4) Measures relating to the conservation of energy
resources
(5) Measures relating to the commercial application of
energy technology
(6) Measures relating to energy information generally
(7) Measures relating to (a) the generation and mar
keting of power (except by federally chartered or
Federal regional power marketing authorities), (b)
the reliability and interstate transmission of,
and ratemaking for, all power, and (c) the siting
of generation facilities, except the installation
of interconnections between government waterpower
projects
(8) Interstate energy compacts
(9) Measures relating to general management of the
Department of Energy and the management and all
functions of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis
sion
(10) Inland waterways
(11) Railroads, including railroad labor, railroad,
retirement and unemployment, except revenue mea
sures related thereto
(12) Regulation of interstate and foreign communica
tions
(13) Securities and exchanges
(14) Consumer affairs and consumer protection
(15) Travel and tourism
(16) Public health and quarantine
(17) Health and health facilities, except health care
supported by payroll deductions
(18) Biomedical research and development.
(19) Nuclear facilities and energy83

83Report on the Activity of the Committee on Enercrv and
Commerce for the 101st Congress. (Washington: US Government
Printing Office, 1991), 1-2.
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APPENDIX C
ISSUES INVESTIGATED BY OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE DURING 101ST CONGRESS

During the 101st Congress (1988-90), the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee held 56 days of public and
executive session hearings on a wide variety of topics.84
The following is a list of issues examined by the subcommit
tee during this period. Those which resulted in formal
hearings are indicated in bold type. An (*) indicates that
a subcommittee report was issued during this Congress.
Interstate/Foreign Commerce
Fastener Safety
Trade Investigations
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988

Pharmaceutical product patent protection
Chinese intellectual property and other trade
concerns
Copyright problems in Taiwan
South African steel investigation
Kawasaki and Nissho-Iwai
Customs fraud enforcement

Foreign direct investment

(*)

Health issues
Generic drugs
FDA enforcement of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
Blood supply safety
FDA surveillance of food imports
(*)
Medical devices
(*)
Seafood inspections
Salmonella Enteritidis in eggs
Insurance for the Elderly
Medigap insurance
Long term care insurance

(*)

Government supported research
Overhead costs
Scientific misconduct
Conflict of interest

Other Investigations:
Bottled water (*)
Prescription drug advertising to consumers

84From Report on the Activity of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce for the 101st Congress. HR-1021, (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 3, 1991), 277.
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Fraud and abuse in clinical laboratories
Infant mortality
Lead in housewares
Pesticide Monitoring Improvement Acts oversight
Sodium Nitro Prusside
Environmental Issues
EPA Office of Inspector General

Superfund implementation
National contingency plan
(*)
Office of Technology Assessment Superfund
report
Review of the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry
Management review of the Superfund program
Oversight of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act
Groundwater monitoring of land disposal
facilities

RCRA corrective action program
RCRA implementation study
New Jersey manifest tracking system
Implementation and expansion of the Montreal
Protocol on CFCs

Other investigations
Fuel economy

EPA pesticide tolerance-setti'ng policies and
procedures
EPA regulation of asbestos
International environmental matters
Gasoline vapor controls
Authority of EPA regarding accidental release
of toxics
Public participation in EPA settlements
Environmental degradation in Latvia (*)
Securities and Finance
Insurance company insolvencies and failures
Insider trading and other abuses

(*)

Procurement abuses by major defense contractors
Northrup Corporation
McDonnell Douglas
Army Apache helicopters
Army CH47D helicopters

Navy A-12 cost overruns
AF C-17 transport plane
Satellite to satellite communications
Lockheed C-5 crash damage kits
Army National Guard procurement of Sperry 500
computers
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Texas Instruments high speed antiradiation
missile
Other procurement investigations
Army aviation safety
(*)
Bath Iron Works DDG-51 Arleigh Burke
destroyer
Martin Marietta/Gerlikon1s ADATS
Adequacy of penalty system
Army Reserve readiness
Air Force acquisition of telecom systems
Other investigations
Auditing and accounting
Merged Surplus and "M" accounts

Multiple listing of trading options
Leveraged buyouts (RJR Nabisco)
(*)
Federal Credit Assistance and Insurance
Program
i

Energy Issues
Energy strategy and supply
Health and safety of nuclear weapons facilities(*)
Safeguards and security at nuclear weapons
facilities

Other investigations:
Nuclear weapons safety
Scientific integrity at DOE's national labs
Worker safety at civilian nuclear power
plants
Technology transfer at DOE
Property management at Lawrence Livermore
Labs
Adequacy of controls for tritium
Contract auditing by DOE
DOE1s environmental testing program
DOE work for others
Oil overcharge enforcement
Miscellaneous
OMB interference in agency rulemaking
Unfair practices - FCC (Telestar)
National Highway Safety Administration
Seat belts
Motor vehicle safety inspections
Auto theft
Accidental fires and other problems in
manufacture of air bags
Aftermarket brake linings for autos and
trucks
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APPENDIX D
MEMBERSHIP OP THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
101st CONGRESS
Democrats:

John D. Dingell (D-MI), Chairman
Ron Wyden, (D-OR)
Gerry Sikorski, (D-MN)
Cardiss Collins (D-IL)
John Bryant, (D-TX)
Douglas Walgren (D-PA) (first session)
Dennis Eckart (D-OH) (first session)
Rick Boucher (D-VA) (first session)
J. Roy Rowland, (D-GA) (second session)
James H. Scheuer, (D-NY) (second session)
Jim Cooper, (D-TN) (second session)
Republicans:

Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (R-VA)
Norman F. Lent, (R-NY)
Michael G. Oxley, (R-OH)
Michael Bilirakis (R-FL)
Alex McMillan (R-NC)
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